Towards Practical Access Control and Usage Control on the Cloud using Trusted Hardware by Djoko Takougue, Judicael Briand
TOWARDS PRACTICAL ACCESS CONTROL AND




M.S. Computer Engineering, University of Pittsburgh, USA, 2015
B.S. Computer Engineering, The University of Akron, USA, 2013
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
School of Computing and Information Sciences Department of
Computer Science in partial fulfillment





DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
This dissertation was presented
by
Judicael Briand Djoko
It was defended on
Nov 15th 2019
and approved by
Adam J. Lee, Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh
Jack Lange, Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh
Panos K. Chrysanthis, Professor, University of Pittsburgh
Balaji Palanisamy, Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh
Dissertation Advisors: Adam J. Lee, Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh,
Jack Lange, Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh
ii
TOWARDS PRACTICAL ACCESS CONTROL AND USAGE CONTROL ON
THE CLOUD USING TRUSTED HARDWARE
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Cloud-based platforms have become the principle way to store, share, and synchronize files
online. For individuals and organizations alike, cloud storage not only provides resource
scalability and on-demand access at a low cost, but also eliminates the necessity of provisioning
and maintaining complex hardware installations.
Unfortunately, because cloud-based platforms are frequent victims of data breaches and
unauthorized disclosures, data protection obliges both access control and usage control to
manage user authorization and regulate future data use. Encryption can ensure data security
against unauthorized parties, but complicates file sharing which now requires distributing
keys to authorized users, and a mechanism that prevents revoked users from accessing or
modifying sensitive content. Further, as user data is stored and processed on remote machines,
usage control in a distributed setting requires incorporating the local environmental context
at policy evaluation, as well as tamper-proof and non-bypassable enforcement. Existing
cryptographic solutions either require server-side coordination, offer limited flexibility in data
sharing, or incur significant re-encryption overheads on user revocation. This combination
of issues are ill-suited within large-scale distributed environments where there are a large
number of users, dynamic changes in user membership and access privileges, and resources
are shared across organizational domains. Thus, developing a robust security and privacy
solution for the cloud requires: fine-grained access control to associate the largest set of users
and resources with variable granularity, scalable administration costs when managing policies
and access rights, and cross-domain policy enforcement.
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To address the above challenges, this dissertation proposes a practical security solution
that relies solely on commodity trusted hardware to ensure confidentiality and integrity
throughout the data lifecycle. The aim is to maintain complete user ownership against
external hackers and malicious service providers, without losing the scalability or availability
benefits of cloud storage. Furthermore, we develop a principled approach that is: (i) portable
across storage platforms without requiring any server-side support or modifications, (ii)
flexible in allowing users to selectively share their data using fine-grained access control, and
(iii) performant by imposing modest overheads on standard user workloads. Essentially, our
system must be client-side, provide end-to-end data protection and secure sharing, without
significant degradation in performance or user experience.
We introduce NeXUS, a privacy-preserving filesystem that enables cryptographic pro-
tection and secure file sharing on existing network-based storage services. NeXUS protects
the confidentiality and integrity of file content, as well as file and directory names, while
mitigating against rollback attacks of the filesystem hierarchy. We also introduce Joplin, a
secure access control and usage control system that provides practical attribute-based sharing
with decentralized policy administration, including efficient revocation, multi-domain policies,
secure user delegation, and mandatory audit logging. Both systems leverage trusted hardware
to prevent the leakage of sensitive material such as encryption keys and access control policies;
they are completely client-side, easy to install and use, and can be readily deployed across
remote storage platforms without requiring any server-side changes or trusted intermediary.
We developed prototypes for NeXUS and Joplin, and evaluated their respective overheads in
isolation and within a real-world environment. Results show that both prototypes introduce
modest overheads on interactive workloads, and achieve portability across storage platforms,
including Dropbox and AFS. Together, NeXUS and Joplin demonstrate that a client-side
solution employing trusted hardware such as Intel SGX can effectively protect remotely stored
data on existing file sharing services.
iv
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Today, cloud-based file sharing platforms are amongst the most popular services on the
Internet. For instance, mainstream file sharing services already boast hundreds of millions in
daily users and host millions of gigabytes in stored files [1, 2, 3, 4]. Through these services,
users gain access to large amounts of highly available storage and can collaborate with other
users globally. Furthermore, by outsourcing data to the cloud, organizations can eliminate the
cost and expertise required for provisioning and maintaining complex hardware installations,
while only paying for what they use. Given other benefits like data backup and recovery,
and the fact that these come at a low cost, it becomes clear why both individuals and
organizations increasingly store private information on the cloud [5].
However, relying on cloud storage poses serious threats to data ownership. File sharing
services are often built on top of third-party object storage platforms (e.g., Amazon S3,
Google Cloud), which distribute user private information across a global network of servers
and authorized client machines. Due to limited operational transparency, users have no clear
control on where their data is stored, who has access, or whether certain operations are
allowed. Unfortunately, even with the provider’s best intentions, cloud-based platforms are
frequent victims of external hackers, malicious cloud insiders, and unexpected disclosures [6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. These high profile incidents indicate that the very concentration of sensitive
information on these platforms not only creates an attack target, but also engenders a
situation whereby a vulnerability affecting a few providers can have a substantial user impact.
For example, in 2015, a vulnerability on Dropbox, Box, and Google Drive allowed third-
party access to shared files after the URL was indexed on search engines [13]. Furthermore,
users have to be wary of unscrupulous service providers, who are legally permitted by
their terms of service to mine and distribute private information without requiring user
1
owner user
Figure 1: Encrypted file synchronization setting model
consent [14, 15, 16, 11]. Thus, as individuals and organizations store more personal and
private information on cloud-based storage platforms, this dissertation develops a real-world
data security solution that is independent of the service provider or any trusted intermediary,
while maintaining the ability to store, share, and synchronize files across user machines.
Existing cryptographic solutions to data security provide confidentiality and integrity by
distributing encryption keys to authorized users, but do not address the practical issues of
user revocation or dynamic access control updates over data stored on the cloud. To prevent
a revoked user from accessing and making future updates, a naive revocation mechanism
involves: (i) downloading the file from the server, (ii) re-encrypting the file with a new key,
(iii) uploading the file to the server, and (iv) distributing the new key to users who are still
authorized. When considering a large-scale environment with thousands of users and files
that change frequently, revoking users through bulk file re-encryption and key distribution
will incur significant computational and network penalties [17]. Thus, scalable access control
on the cloud requires sophisticated key management enabling users to manage vast amounts
of resources across administrative domains.
This dissertation focuses on data security in the file synchronization setting, whereby
users employ a client application to manage and share files that are stored on a remote
server (Figure 1). There is no direct user-to-user communication, users have no control
over the server infrastructure, and the server is responsible for synchronizing file changes
across individual client machines. Examples include mainstream file sharing services such as
Dropbox and Google Drive, as well as traditional network filesystems like AFS and NFS. We
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argue that users can still benefit from these services without compromising on data ownership.
Our goal is to ensure data protection against other users of the service, external hackers,
malicious cloud administrators, and unscrupulous service providers, such that confidentiality
and integrity is guaranteed even in the event of a data breach or unauthorized disclosure.
Furthermore, for mass user adoption, a practical security solution must fulfill the following
high-level requirements: (i) Portability, for deployment across storage providers without
requiring any server-side modifications or trusted intermediaries; (ii) Flexibility, whereby
users can selectively dictate the conditions for data access using fine-grained policies; and
(iii) Performance, in that typical user workloads run with modest overheads. Esseentially,
given the key role of user sharing in the growth of cloud services, dynamic policy changes
must be efficient, and should not significantly degrade system performance.
1.1 CURRENT APPROACHES
Consider an organization outsourcing internal documents to the cloud for shared access with
employees and other external organizations. Notwithstanding the scalability and availability
of cloud storage, the organization still wishes to keep their data as private as if it were stored
on-premise. Access control is the ability to prevent unauthorized operations over sensitive
information, while ensuring data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In a client-server
model, enforcement could be provided by: (i) deploying a server-side monitor that mediates
every access request against a centralized policy database, or (ii) applying privacy-preserving
techniques over sensitive data without any changes to the existing infrastructure.
Using a server-side reference monitor, Figure 2a depicts a user requesting read access
to the “straff.txt” file. To prevent unauthorized access, every file is protected using an
Access Control List (ACL) that contains the list of authorized users and their corresponding
permissions (e.g., read, write, delete). In this example, the ACL shows that Alice can read
the file. Upon receiving the request, the monitor checks the user’s identity and permission
within the ACL before returning the requested file to the user. However, this approach

















Figure 2: Client requesting straff.txt file from the server
protect the file contents at rest and in transit. Unfortunately, the threats surrounding cloud
infrastructure makes such trustworthy assumptions non-trivial on the part of the organization.
Alternatively, data protection could be performed before uploading documents unto the
server. A natural protection mechanism is to encrypt the file using a symmetric key, and
distributing the key to authorized users. By protecting the file encryption key, symmetric
encryption provides both data confidentiality and integrity to prevent attackers (who do not
possess the key) from recovering or (undetectably) tampering with the file contents. Figure 2b
shows the client-side mechanism for requesting the “straff.txt” file, which the server simply
returns as an encrypted file without performing any extra permission checks. Once on their
local machine, an authorized user in possession of the symmetric key can then proceed to
decrypt the file and recover its contents. Since possession of the encryption key grants access
to the contents, revoking a user essentially consists in re-encrypting the file with a new key,
and re-distributing the new symmetric key to users who are still authorized. However, a
naive implementation could incur significant computational and network penalties, especially
as the number of users and resources explodes.
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1.2 CHALLENGES
Authorization represents the set of permitted actions a user can exercise over objects [18].
Although authorization has been extensively researched within static scenarios where the
set of users and resources is known, the unique characteristics of the cloud imposes several
challenges. (i) First, user private data is stored and processed on remote machines that lie
outside the owner’s control. Consequently, in addition to protecting data at rest and during
use, the security framework must support the inclusion of the user’s environmental context
(e.g., time) when evaluating authorization requests. (ii) Second, large-scale cloud deployments
have thousands of users accessing an unlimited number of files across organizational domains.
Thus, policy specification should provide administrators and data owners enough flexibility
in associating users and resources with arbitrary granularity, without requiring a priori
knowledge of specific entities. (iii) Third, permissions and policies change dynamically as
users and resources are added, removed, and modified; therefore, policy administration costs
must be scalable when updating access permissions and revoking users.
Addressing the above challenges requires a careful combination of privacy-preserving
techniques and distributed usage control. The former transforms data in a manner that
preserves confidentiality and integrity, whereas the latter extends access control notions
to prevent data misuse even after authorization is granted. Essentially, usage control not
only empowers users to selectively share data with arbitrary granularity, but also ensures
continuous policy enforcement as the access context changes throughout the data lifecycle.
For example, the usage control policy “delete the file after 10 writes” could abort an ongoing
access request under satisfying conditions.
Privacy-preserving computation can be achieved using cryptography or isolated execution
that relies on software and hardware mechanisms to prevent untrusted access. Much research
has been done on cryptographic access control to protect sensitive data [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26]. However, when employed in a distributed setting, encryption turns user authorization
into a key management problem; existing solutions either require server-side coordination,
impose burdensome key management on users, or incur severe bulk re-encryption overheads on
access revocation. Furthermore, incorporating environmental factors during policy evaluation
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is not achievable using cryptography alone, but requires a tamper-proof and non-bypassable
mechanism to enforce context-aware policies on remote machines.
Recently, Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) such as Intel SGX and ARM Trust-
zone that provide isolated execution, sealed storage, and remote attestation have become
standard security features in commodity machines and mobile devices; with a small TCB
and minimal performance overheads, they provide a tamper-proof environment to securely
manage sensitive applications secrets [27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. Existing work employing TEEs
to secure untrusted storage require trusted hardware support on the server, which may not
possible for users of typical file sharing platforms [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. In this dissertation,
it is our hypothesis that the widespread availability of hardware-enabled trusted execution
environments on consumer devices can provide data confidentiality and integrity, as well as
scalable access and usage control within an untrusted cloud environment, while improving
portability, flexibility, and performance over unmodified remote storage platforms.
1.3 APPROACH AND CONTRIBUTIONS
The high-level approach consists in combining the benefits of hardware-enabled TEEs and
cryptographic protection to ensure confidentiality and integrity throughout the data lifecycle.
TEEs perform arbitrary computations in a manner that cannot be subverted by any (trusted
or untrusted) party, whereas cryptography relies on mathematical theory to protect persistent
data. We employ TEEs to encrypt sensitive user information inside metadata objects without
leaking key material. This prevents an attacker from recovering any sensitive information
as encrypted content is only decryptable within the TEE, which can leverage its isolated
runtime to enforce access control. Also, because the TEE controls key material, the user is
not subject to the data retention policies of the service provider, since deleting the encryption
key essentially makes the file content irrecoverable.
We propose two systems: NeXUS, a stackable filesystem that provides cryptographic
protections to shared files, and Joplin, an access and usage control system for dynamic
and fine-grained data sharing. NeXUS ensures confidentiality and integrity of file content,
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alongside the names of files and directories. On the other hand, Joplin protects access control
information, including user privileges and policies. Both systems are completely client-side,
do not require any server-side changes, and leverage trusted hardware to enable transparent
security protections over unmodified storage. Unlike prior solutions that require server-side
hardware support or rely on a service provider enclave, our approach is novel in that a
user-controlled TEE protects private information on individual client machines. As such,
NeXUS and Joplin provide a solid foundation for developing user-centric and decentralized
policy enforcement using trusted hardware. Our contributions are as follows:
Implementation and Evaluation. Building a scalable system requires taking into account
TEE runtime limitations, as well as the I/O characteristics of the underlying storage platform.
For example, current real-world TEEs have limited memory and restricted network access,
whereas cloud storage imposes significant network latency. We developed prototypes for
both NeXUS and Joplin using Intel SGX as the TEE. Notably, NeXUS manages a virtual
filesystem, whereas Joplin hosts a policy engine that evaluates user-specified policies. We
ported NeXUS to run atop FUSE to allow unmodified applications access to protected
files on any storage platform. This allows users to maintain their typical workflow, without
requiring any modifications to the OS or underlying filesystem. The Joplin prototype builds
upon this for expressive access control and usage control over shared files. To demonstrate
the effectiveness of our approach, we evaluated both prototypes over unmodified network
storage such as Dropbox and AFS. Specifically, we measured the network latency under
different scenarios using a variety of microbenchmarks and end-to-end tests. Results show that
both prototypes are applicable to a wide range of user workloads, and provide scalable data
protection when processing filesystem data and access control information. Therefore, users
can manage protected data on existing storage platforms without significant performance
degradation in their typical workflow.
Expressiveness and Obligations. Developing a robust access control and usage control
solution for a large-scale cloud environment requires a fine-grained model for formulating
policies, while also accommodating the local user context. Attribute-Based Access Control
(ABAC) has been proposed as an expressive and dynamic model for open collaborative
environments; ABAC determines access requests by evaluating a set of policies against user
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attributes, object attributes, and relevant environmental conditions. Obligations pertain
to usage control, and are mandatory actions or requirements that are fulfilled as part of
a request (e.g., delete the file after 20 reads). Joplin provides continuous enforcement
using cryptographically-protected metadata and a policy interpreter, while addressing other
the practical challenges of decentralized policy enforcement, such as efficient revocation,
multi-domain policies, secure user delegation, and mandatory audit logging. Access control
information is completely managed and protected by the TEE, which enforces authorization
requests using an ABAC model and performs obligations. As a result, data owners can
manage sensitive content on the cloud using fine-grained authorization and obligation policies
independently of the service provider or any trusted intermediary.
Portability and Performance. For maximum user adoption, it is essential that our system
does not lock users into any particular service provider in order to achieve scalable access
control. Therefore, we minimize our storage assumptions and treat the cloud storage as another
generic layer providing a filesystem interface, while enabling efficient user revocation and
access right updates. Specifically, both access control information and sensitive key material
are stored inside cryptographically-protected metadata files that are only decryptable within
the TEE. This approach requires no server-side changes, and allows seamless key distribution
as the server synchronizes the encrypted metadata files across client machines. Furthermore,
because key material remains under TEE control, revocation only requires updating and
re-encrypting relatively small metadata, thereby obviating the bulk re-encryption and key
redistribution overheads typically associated with purely cryptographic solutions. Overall,
our approach allows for arbitrary deployment scenarios as it is seamlessly portable across
remote storage platforms, while introducing minimal policy management costs.
Rollback protection. NeXUS prevents rollback attacks against protected files and directo-
ries. Because sensitive information is stored as a collection of files on the server, a malicious
service provider may perform a rollback attack whereby older versions of the metadata
are returned to the user. Although the returned metadata is cryptographically valid, this
attack not only violates metadata freshness, but also the consistency of the entire protected
state. To provide stronger integrity guarantees, we maintain a hash tree alongside filesystem
information within the metadata files. A hash tree is an efficient method for authenticating a
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collection of items using a cryptographic digest. When decrypting metadata at access time,
the TEE can validate that the metadata is fresh with respect to a known local version and
other metadata in the filesystem hierarchy. With these defenses, users can ensure that every
filesystem state results from a valid sequence of changes, while limiting the server’s ability to
move/rename files and hide file updates.
1.4 ROADMAP
The remainder of this thesis follows a chronological organization. In Chapter 2 we cover the
necessary background for cryptography, trusted hardware, and access control. Chapter 3
outlines our system and threat model. We discuss the design of NeXUS in chapter 4, and
elaborate on how we enable cryptographic file sharing on existing cloud-based platforms.
After giving some background and problem description, we proceed with a system design
of its overall architecture, and implementation using Intel SGX. This chapter closes with
a performance evaluation, related work, and conclusions. Chapter 5 introduces Joplin, a
secure access and usage control system. We begin with some background and related work in
decentralized policy enforcement. Then, we describe its design and implementation showing
how its client-side approach can provide secure and scalable enforcement. We evaluate our
SGX-based prototype via use cases and performance benchmarks. Chapter 6 demonstrates
how NeXUS and Joplin meet their security guarantees in protecting filesystem information
and enforcing access control. We conclude this dissertation in 7 with a summary of our
contributions and some discussion of future work.
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2.0 BACKGROUND
This chapter covers the necessary background in privacy-preserving computation and decen-
tralized access enforcement. The former can be achieved either with cryptography (Section 2.1)
or isolated execution. On the cloud, virtualization provides isolated resource management
(i.e., CPU, memory, storage), but requires including the hypervisor and other untrusted
software components as part of the trusted computing base. We explore how novel trusted
hardware extensions can alleviate these security concerns (Section 2.2), and focus on Intel
SGX (Section 2.3) as our target real-world instantiation. We close the chapter with an
exploration of access and usage control (Section 2.4).
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRELIMINARIES
This dissertation employs encryption and hashing primitives as building blocks in providing
confidentiality, integrity, and freshness within a scalable system. Confidentiality prevents an
attacker from recovering the plaintext, whereas integrity detects any improper or unauthorized
modification of the ciphertext. Unlike confidentiality, integrity cannot prevent the attacker
from tampering the file, but only provides detection. Integrity can be extended with a
monotonic counter or random nonce to provide freshness. In exchanges involving multiple
rounds (e.g., key exchange), freshness ensures that a given message is not a replay from a
stale version. Consider that Carey stores tax return documents in an encrypted filesystem
hosted on the server. Upon encrypting each file: (i) Confidentiality ensures that an attacker
cannot see how much Carey made that year, (ii) Integrity guarantees that the contents are
authentic and tamper-evident, and (iii) Freshness detects if the server is returning an older
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version of the tax documents by comparing it with a known version. Moreover, we assume
these cryptographic primitives are theoretically secure, and treat them as blackboxes.
2.1.1 Encryption and Hashing
At a high level, a encryption algorithm takes a sensitive plaintext (P ) and an encryption
key (K) as inputs, and outputs a random stream of bytes as ciphertext (C), such that
C = E(K,P ). Conversely, a decryption algorithm uses the decryption key (K−1) to recover
the original plaintext as follows: P = D(K−1, C). Encryption mainly provides confidentiality,
and the ciphertext length is a function of the encryption algorithm and the plaintext.
On the other hand, a hashing algorithm is a one-way function takes an input message
(M) to return cryptographically secure hash of a given length: H(M) → {0, 1}l. Hashing
provides integrity, and can be combined with a key to produce Message Authentication Code
(MAC) or tag, such that MAC(K,M)→ {0, 1}l. The MAC or tag output is small and fixed
(e.g., usually 32 bytes), and cannot be reverted to the original message.
2.1.2 Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption
Cryptographic protection relies on the secrecy of encryption keys, which must be large,
unique, and unpredictable. As such, key generation relies on a good source of randomness
(e.g., CPU temperature) to ensure that the cryptographic operation is semantically secure,
and the attacker cannot feasibly guess the encryption key.
Symmetric encryption uses the same key for both encryption and decryption. There
exists 2 types: block ciphers that split messages into blocks, and stream ciphers that consume
messages as a bitstream. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the state of the art
symmetric key algorithm, and enjoys hardware acceleration support on various instruction
sets [38, 39]. Further, symmetric primitives can be combined with a hashing function to
provide both confidentiality and integrity. AES-GCM is an Authenticated Encryption with
Associated Data (AEAD) cipher that combines the AES cipher and the GHASH hashing
function [40, 41]. Although fast at encrypting large amounts of data, symmetric encryption
requires establishing a common secret between the parties.
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Asymmetric encryption uses different keys for encryption and decryption. The process
relies on a (public, private) keypair, such that any plaintext encrypted with the public key
is only decryptable using the corresponding private key, and vice versa. Although there
exist a mathematical relation between the keys, the public key that can be released without
compromising the private key, which must remain in the possession of the owner. A notable
application of public key encryption is unforgeable signatures, which are the created using a
signing algorithm with the hash of a message and a user’s private key as inputs. RSA is an
example of a signing algorithm [42]. Signatures are only verifiable using the corresponding
public key, and provide origin authenticity (i.e., integrity) as the private key is only accessible
to its owner. Although they use larger keys and are significantly slower than symmetric
encryption, public key algorithms are mostly used to encrypt small pieces of data (e.g.,
encryption keys). Another example is hybrid encryption over untrusted storage, whereby a
copy of the file encryption key is encrypted with the user’s public key. At access time, the
authorized user employs their private key to recover the file encryption key, before decrypting
the file. RSA is also an encryption algorithm. As such, asymmetric encryption perfectly
suitable to establish a secure communication channel in open environments where there is no
preexisting shared secret. Elliptic-curve cryptography [43] can be used in a key exchange
protocol to generate a common secret over an insecure channel. Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) is an example of a key exchange protocol [44]; it is usually coupled with nonces and
a signature algorithm to ensure freshness and origin authenticity, respectively.
2.1.3 Cryptographic Notation
Table 1 lists the cryptographic primitives employed in this dissertation. Each primitive is
used with their recommended key size, along with necessary additional information (e.g.,
using initialization vectors). We denote a (public, private) keypair as {pk, sk}, and use
PKGEN() to indicate public keypair generation. SIGN(sk,m) represents a signature over
m using sk, and VERIFY(pk, s) indicates the verification of a signature s using pk. Lastly,
ENC/DEC(k,m) denotes symmetric encryption/decryption. Note that by using AES-GCM
AEAD symmetric encryption, we gain confidentiality alongside integrity.
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Algorithm Key size (bits) Guarantees
AES-GCM 128 Confidentiality, Integrity (Tag), Freshness
RSA 2048 Integrity (signatures)
ECDH 256 Freshness (Key exchange)
Table 1: Cryptographic primitives and their respective key sizes
2.2 TRUSTED EXECUTION ENVIRONMENTS
A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is a secure, integrity-protected environment, con-
sisting of processing, memory, and storage capabilities [45]. TEEs facilitate the instantiation
of trusted applications that are isolated within a hardware-protected context. Specifically,
by placing the trusted application binary within a hardware-protected memory region, the
CPU ensures confidentiality and integrity of both code and data against all untrusted system
components, including other system processes, OS or hypervisor, and even external hardware
devices. The TEE runs at the highest privilege level within the CPU context, and updates
its state dynamically as the trusted application updates registers and memory locations. For
cloud-based applications, TEEs can be remotely attested to prove the authenticity of the
trusted application and the underlying platform.
Although early instantiations of trusted hardware were provided via secure co-processors
like the TPM, they only provided a fixed set functions and a limited interface for processing
cryptographic material [46]. However, recent years have witnessed several TEEs providing
general purpose secure computation such as Intel SGX on x86 machines, and ARM Trustzone
on mobile and IoT devices (e.g., Samsung KNOX) [27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. ARM Trustzone splits
the processor into two logical modes: a secure world containing the TEE, and a normal world
containing the normal OS runtime [27]. Each world has separate registers and memory, such
that the normal world cannot observe the memory accesses of the secure world. Trustzone
ensures that only the secure world can be executing at any time on a given chip, thereby
13
preventing potential side-channel attacks from untrusted software. This is unlike Intel SGX,
which multiplexes hardware resources between trusted and untrusted software [28]. Sanctum
and Keystone are open source TEE design that target the RISC-V hardware; their main
improvement over SGX is the prevention of a class of side-channel attacks [30].
These features has inspired extensive work on TEE-enabled secure remote computation,
including blockchains, machine learning, databases, IoT, and remote data storage [47, 32,
48, 49, 34, 35, 37, 50, 51, 52]. However, extending trusted hardware protections beyond the
isolated runtime environment unto persistent storage poses several challenges. Although
the main idea behind TEEs is encompassing security-critical functionality within a small
container that exposes a minimal interface (e.g., cryptography), a full fledged application
requires integration with the rich execution environment provided by the OS and other
untrusted applications. Specifically, data protection must persist across TEE restarts and
data migrations, while accommodating runtime restrictions such as limited memory (e.g.,
SGX provides about 96MB) and no direct access to system software functionality (e.g.,
networking, time). Therefore, the trusted application must perform proper sanity-checks and
apply cryptographic protections when copying sensitive data across the TEE boundary.
2.3 INTEL SOFTWARE GUARD EXTENSIONS
Intel SGX [28, 53] is a set of x86-based processor extensions that provide secure execution
environments called enclaves. These extensions enable clients to both measure and verify the
code running within an enclave, while also providing very strong isolation guarantees. The
measurement is a hash of the initial enclave code and data to denote the enclave identity,
which is verified by the CPU to detect any tampering at launch time. Further, the enclave
measurement is also used to generate reports during enclave attestation. When activated,
enclaves execute in user space and are protected from inspection or modification by other
processes, the OS and hypervisor, BIOS, or even hardware peripherals. At the hardware level,
enclaves exist as a special CPU context that ensures data privacy by blocking access from
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Figure 3: Isolated Execution. The enclave (grey) has a separate stack, heap, and code sections
that are independent of the untrusted portion.
the CPU boundary. Secure execution is achieved by placing both the code and data contents
needed for a given computation inside the protected memory region, thus ensuring both
confidentiality as well as integrity of the execution. With such guarantees, the SGX platform
effectively limits an application’s Trusted Computing Base (TCB) to the CPU package and
the enclave code. We now describe the SGX features relevant to this dissertation: Isolated
Execution, Sealed Storage, and Remote Attestation. For a more in-depth discussion of SGX,
we refer the reader to the following publications [29, 54, 28, 53, 55].
2.3.1 Isolated Execution
An SGX application is comprised of an untrusted portion and an enclave. The untrusted
portion coordinates the enclave lifecycle by invoking both system calls (e.g., enclave creation
and destruction) and userspace SGX instructions (e.g., entering the enclave). Note that
the untrusted portion does not have access to any application secrets (e.g., encryption keys,
passwords), but simply serves as a proxy for enclave communication (e.g., network access)
and integration (e.g., file interface). On the other hand, the enclave exposes a set of entry
functions, which are invoked by the untrusted portion to perform specific operations.
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Depicted in Figure 3, an enclave is set to be an isolated region within a userspace
application. When creating the enclave, the CPU performs a secure hash measurement of its
contents as they are copied into a protected region of physical memory called the Enclave
Page Cache (EPC). The EPC is encrypted and inaccessible from untrusted code, including
OS/hypervisor, and hardware devices. Because SGX assumes a multiprocess environment,
it allows privileged software to control the assignment of EPC pages unto multiple enclave
instances. The CPU prevents unauthorized cross-enclave access by tagging each EPC page
with their assigned enclave instance and checking this at runtime. On termination, the
enclave’s EPC pages are cleared to prevent any leakage of sensitive information.
The application enters the enclave by invoking an SGX ecall that switches the CPU
context and jumps to a predefined entrypoint of the enclave code. While executing, the
enclave code performs arbitrary computations, accesses enclave memory, and can read and
write to untrusted memory. By allowing access to untrusted buffer pointers, an enclave can
efficiently exchange data with the host application. However, the enclave code is not allowed
to directly call untrusted functions, but must invoke an SGX ocall that explicitly switches
from enclave mode before calling the untrusted function. The enclave memory is defined as a
linear range within the virtual space the host application. Per virtual memory semantics,
the OS is responsible for translating enclave virtual addresses into their corresponding EPC
page, but the CPU ensures that enclave memory can only be accessed from enclave code.
The enclave code exits once execution is completed, and can be re-entered on subsequent
invocations. The enclave memory state is preserved across invocations, but is lost once the
enclave is terminated.
2.3.2 Sealed Storage
From the description above, the enclave loses all data on termination. To securely persist
sensitive data across executions, SGX allows enclaves to derive a sealing key from platform
keys burned in the CPU fuses. The sealing key is symmetric, and can then be used to encrypt
and seal sensitive data before copying it to untrusted memory. On restart, the enclave
regenerates the sealing key to decrypt the sealed information. The sealing key can only be
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Figure 4: SGX Remote Attestation example for simple ECDH key exchange. The enclave
quote contains the client-generated nonce and both public ECDH keys. In the end, both the
client and enclave generate the shared key K.
generated within enclave memory, and is unique to the enclave identity and the particular
CPU within which the enclave is executing. More specifically, this sealing key cannot be
derived in any other SGX machine or by a different enclave on this particular SGX machine.
As a result, SGX sealing is especially useful to protect long-term secrets on the local machine
in a manner that prevents access outside of an enclave context as offline migration to other
SGX platforms. For example, the enclave could generate a public-private keypair and seal
the private key to local disk. At runtime, the enclave private key is unsealed within trusted
space, and then used as cryptographic material to establish secure communication channels.
2.3.3 Remote Attestation
Remote attestation allows a challenger to validate the identity of a remote enclave, and
its underlying platform. Specifically, attestation confirms that the trusted hardware is still
considered valid (e.g., CPU model is not blacklisted), and the secure software runtime
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is initialized correctly. In SGX, this process relies on two Intel-provisioned enclaves: a
Provisioning Enclave that verifies the platform with Intel’s attestation service to fetch a
unique asymmetric attestation key, and a Quoting Enclave that uses the attestation key
to generate quotes. A quote is a signature of the target enclave’s measurement along with
enclave-generated data (e.g., nonce, ECD public key), which is used to ensure freshness.
This allows the challenger to verify the quote using an Intel-provided public certificate, and
ascertain the enclave identity by checking its measurement and the additional data. Figure 4
depicts a simple ECDH key exchange, where the client generates a nonce and the remote
enclave generates a quote. A critical step in the exchange is to verify the quote via the Intel
attestation service, which ensures that the quote is from a valid enclave running on SGX
hardware. Once the quote is validated, the client then uses the contained enclave public
ECDH key to derive a common secret that is only derivable within the enclave. As such,
remote attestation is essential in bootstrapping secure communication channels with a remote
enclave, before provisioning any secrets (e.g., sending a password).
2.3.4 SGX Limitations
The Intel SGX SDK provides a complete toolchain for building and distributing enclaves. Its
programming model relies on the programmer to carefully split the application into trusted
and untrusted portions, as well as define an interface for exchanging data across the enclave
boundary. This is specified as a set of ecalls and ocalls within an EDL file. The enclave
runtime is managed by system software, which shares hardware resources between other
applications and device drivers. Therefore, beyond resource contention, understanding the
limitations of SGX hardware is critical to design a practical and secure enclave.
• The EPC memory has a current maximum size of 128MB, which leaves about 96MB for
application enclaves (some is used for SGX metadata). For larger enclave workloads or
in situations of high memory pressure, the OS can swap EPC pages with main memory
using SGX privileged instructions. Before copying EPC pages into main memory, the
CPU encrypts and applies freshness protections to prevent replay attacks from privileged
software. This paging mechanism incurs significant performance overheads of up to 40K
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cycles, especially when the enclave working set exceeds 128MB [56, 57].
• Because the enclave cannot directly invoke untrusted functions, access to system services
(e.g., file I/O, time) requires exiting the enclave, executing the system call, copying the
results into enclave memory, and re-entering the enclave. These enclave transitions are
expensive as they require flushing and restoring the CPU context to prevent data leaks.
Although library OSes can facilitate enclave communication with system software, such
an approach not only explodes the enclave TCB, but may also conversely affect overall
application performance [58, 59, 60]. Conversely, we argue that enclave applications can be
tailored to operate within a dynamic cloud environment, without requiring any server-side
support for trusted hardware.
• The enclave runtime can be interrupted at any time (e.g., page fault, exception), which
triggers an Asynchronous Enclave Exit (AEX). SGX handles this by safeguarding the
enclave state for resumption once the fault is handled. Each AEX overhead is minor but
repeated exits could seriously slow down the enclave execution.
• SGX sealing does not offer any rollback protection to prevent sensitive state replay in
between enclave restarts. Therefore in practice, applications desiring strong freshness
guarantees have either resorted to slow and write-limited hardware monotonic counters, or
relied on a distributed quorum of enclaves [47, 61, 62].
• Several side-channel attacks have been identified on SGX, including cache attacks, page-fault
attacks, branch prediction attacks, and speculative execution. These attacks exploit the
fact that the SGX architecture collocates enclave execution on the same hardware as other
system resources. In this dissertation, SGX side-channel attacks are considered out-of-scope.
However, work on defense measures is currently the subject of active research [63, 64, 65,
66, 67, 68, 69], and can be applied orthogonally to our work.
2.4 ACCESS AND USAGE CONTROL
Access control is employed to enforce security requirements such as confidentiality and integrity
of data resources (e.g., files, database tables) to prevent unauthorized use of resources (e.g.,
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programs, processor time, expensive devices), or to prevent denial of service to legitimate
users [18]. The decision to authorize or deny a given operation is guided by a security policy.
Examples of practical violations that can be prevented are students seeing the grade files or an
employee tampering documents. Thus, an access control system is comprised of: (i) policies
that dictate the authorization conditions, (ii) a formal model that defines core access control
elements and their relations (e.g., users, attributes), and (iii) an enforcement mechanism that
provides low-level functions and implements system policies according to the model. Because
policy expressiveness is ultimately dictated by the access control model, selecting one that is
suitable for the target use-case is critical. On the other hand, a reference monitor unifies
policy enforcement by mediating all object accesses, but its implementation is typically a
function of system constraints and environmental factors. We go over existing access control
models and reference architectures to explore how they can be practically implemented within
a dynamic cloud environment.
2.4.1 Traditional Access Control
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is a model whereby data owners can grant or revoke
access to their objects, such that authorization consists in validating the user’s identity
within an access structure [70]. DAC is popular within OS and database system as ACLs
or user capability lists, where each file/row has an owner who can share access with other
users or groups in the system using predefined permissions. For example, Alice might create
a shared folder within her home directory on a shared server, and specify that the “work”
group has both read and write access. This form of decentralized management alleviates the
administrative burden, as users can discretely delegate their assigned privileges to others.
However, because the data owner cannot prevent leakage of assigned privileges, DAC is more
suitable for environments where the set of users and their possible operations are known.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) eliminates user discretion and restricts information flow
using security classifications and system-wide policies [71]. For example, in the Bell-LaPadula
confidentiality model, the administrator assigns a clearance level to each user and a sensitivity
level to each object, such that users cannot read objects at a higher classification nor write
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to objects at inferior classifications. To inhibit data modifications, the Biba Integrity model
allows a users to read objects at a higher classification, but can only write to lower classified
objects. However, MAC models are best suited for rigid environments such as military and
government agencies, where there is no concept of user ownership, and data confidentiality
and integrity are of primary concern. Unfortunately, this cannot be feasibly applied to open
environments where user membership and access rights are dynamic.
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is an approach whereby administrators define roles;
grant permissions to roles according to tasks; and assign users to roles based on their duties [72].
Users can activate a subset of their assigned roles for a given session, and then access the
objects permitted by the activated roles. RBAC improves permission management over
MAC and DAC, as roles group users by responsibility and users can control how roles access
objects they own. For additional flexibility, roles can be organized in a hierarchy to inherit
permissions between junior and senior roles, and extended with constraints to provide rich
semantics (e.g., separation of duty). However, RBAC is more suited for organizations where
the role definitions are static, and user responsibilities do not change frequently. Because
permission management only depends on role assignment and requires knowledge of the user
or object entity, RBAC does not readily support multi-domain policies where entities are not
known in advance, and environmental context is required for multi-modal access control.
2.4.2 Attribute-Based Access Control
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) is an emergent model that determines authorization
requests using user attributes, object attributes, environment attributes, and policies expressed
as logical sentences over those attributes [73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 73, 78, 79]. Attributes are traits
that are either statically assigned by the administrator (e.g., role, clearance), or dynamically
set by the runtime (e.g., time, IP). For example, after assigning the necessary atttributes,
an organization can specify the given policy to protect internal documents: “Insiders can
write Feedback documents before 1PM ”. As a result, attributes can group users and objects
with arbitrary granularity and without the explicit identification of pairwise relationships







such that expressiveness is only limited by the policy language and the richness of attributes.
With such flexibility, administrators can formulate a concise set of policies to regulate user
authorization, without a priori knowledge of individual user or object entities. Attributes
and their values are captured as users and objects are provisioned unto the system, while
keeping the pairwise relationships encoded within the existing policies. As a result, ABAC
provides dynamic access control as changes in attributes may result in a different evaluation
result between requests.
Many ABAC variants exist, but in this dissertation we focus on ABACα [75], a foundational
model with minimal assumptions on system attributes and administrative control. The state
of an ABAC system consists of users (U), objects (O), user attributes (UA), object attributes
(OA), permissions (P), and authorization policies. Users are authenticated individuals
requesting access, and objects are protected resources. Attribute are key-value pairs, and
operate as functions that takes a user or object entity to return an atomic value or a set
of values. Each user is associated with a set of user attributes that are assigned by the
system administrator (e.g., name, occupation). Objects are created by users, and likewise
have a corresponding set of object attributes (e.g., type, format). Permissions are simply the
possible actions that users can perform on objects (e.g., read, write, delete). Policies govern
access to system resources, and are expressed as a boolean combination of attributes. Each
authorization policy takes the permission, user, and object as inputs; returns a true or false
depending on their attributes. A user is permitted access on an object if there exist a policy
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that satisfies a subset of the user and object attributes.
Despite its simplicity, ABACα still provides enough expressive power to configure MAC,
DAC, and even RBAC. For instance, ACLs could be represented by associating each object
with as many attributes as there are permissions; each attribute maps to a set of authorized
users. Likewise, capabilities are user attributes that map permissions to a set of objects.
MAC security labels can be handled by atomic-valued user (e.g., clearance) and object (e.g.,
sensitivity) attributes. To support RBAC, each user has an associated user attribute function
that returns a set of roles, while objects are assigned attributes that map each permission
to a list of roles. This has resulted in several works proposing enhancements of traditional
access control models with attributes [80, 81].
Traditionally encompassed within a trusted reference monitor, the enforcement mechanism
must be integrated with other security components such as authentication, administration,
cryptographic protection, and audit logging, while also distributing access control information
via the storage infrastructure. In Figure 6, a minimal reference monitor consists of the
Policy Decision Point (PDP), Policy Information Point (PIP), and Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP). The PIP is responsible for fetching and updating access control information such as
attributes and policies. On each access request from the PEP, the PDP communicates with
the PIP to fetch the necessary access control information before updating its internal state
and evaluating system policies. The PEP enforces the PDP result, and only releases the
object if the user is authorized.
However, access control is restricted to one-time request-response authorization, such
that once a user is granted access, there’s no further action that regulates future data usage.
As usage spans over a longer time period, a policy such as “do not read consumer report
after 30 days,” could invalidate future data access. Unlike traditional closed-world settings
in which users are known beforehand and enforcement occurs within a trusted subsystem,
this may be problematic in an open setting whereby data storage and processing occurs on
remote machines. Thus, in a distributed cloud environment, the security framework should
allow data owners to specify what factors to continuously re-evaluate while access is ongoing.
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Figure 6: Reference monitor Architecture
2.4.3 Usage Control
Usage control (UCON) extends traditional access control notions with attribute mutability
and continuous enforcement [82, 83, 84, 85]. Mutability refers to the fact that the user’s access
may change while access is in progress. This may be the result of the usage or a static update
from the administrator. Continuous enforcement ensures that usage policies are re-evaluated
throughout the usage period, and may result in a termination if considered invalid. With
attribute-based authorization model, UCON also introduces obligations and conditions as
part of a usage policy. Obligations denote mandatory action or requirements that have to be
fulfilled before, during, and after usage, whereas conditions define the necessary environment
context before and during usage. Usage control can be enforced using the same architecture
as access control. However usage control in distributed cloud environments present two
principal challenges: (1) integrating environmental factors beyond user and object attributes,
and (2) tamper-proof and verifiable enforcement mechanism [86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92]. In
this dissertation, we leverage the isolation and attestation features of commodity trusted
hardware to enable distributed usage control.
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3.0 SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
We consider a typical cloud storage service, in which the service’s users download and run a
client-side program to access the remote storage platform. Data is stored on remote cloud-
based systems that are under the control of the service provider. In addition to ensuring data
persistence and availability, the cloud service typically provides authentication and access
control, but in a way that requires the user to trust the service implicitly. Users interact
with their data via their local file system API, thus allowing arbitrary applications on their
systems to access and operate on remotely-stored data. Beyond regular file system access,
many services also provide auxiliary sharing capabilities with other users of the service.
We follow prior work in cryptographic storage by considering an owner who sets up a
secure volume inside a synchronized directory, and shares this with multiple users [93]. System
actions are a combination of key-management operations and cryptographic protections,
which are observed as encrypted reads and writes on the server. Within this context, we
aim to provide users with additional security guarantees against unauthorized disclosure
or modification of their files without hindering their ability to share these files with other
authorized users.
Security Objective. Unless granted explicit access by the owner, file contents along with
access control information must be inaccessible to unauthorized entities and tamper-evident.
In this case, unauthorized entities may include other users of the storage service, entities
monitoring communication between the user and the storage service, and the storage service
provider itself. We are concerned solely with the protection of user-created content: i.e.,
the confidentiality and integrity of the contents of files, file names, and directory names, as
well as the integrity of the directory structure. Additionally, we aim to provide: (i) Forward
secrecy to prevent revoked users from accessing future access control updates even when they
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are in possession of older files, and (ii) Backward secrecy to prevent newly added users from
accessing older data versions.
Threat Model. We consider an attacker who has complete control of the server (including
the OS or hypervisor) and can thus access or alter any files stored on the server. The attacker
may also tamper with, delete, reorder, or replay all network packets exchanged between the
server and the client. We do not consider availability attacks (e.g., denial-of-service), as
our primary concern is protecting the confidentiality and integrity of file system contents.
We do not protect against access pattern attacks, which can be addressed using orthogonal
techniques [33, 94, 36]. Users can read/write data they are allowed to, and may attempt to
read and modify files to which they do not have access. Since authorized users ultimately gain
access to decrypted file contents, we do not consider client-side malware that may maliciously
leak files that have been decrypted by authorized users.
We assume that each user has access to an SGX-enabled CPU running a commodity
OS. Our enclave is assumed to be correctly implemented and free of any security-relevant
vulnerabilities. Also, we assume the enclave attestation and memory protection features
of the SGX hardware function properly: i.e., once the enclave’s identity is established,
enclave-provisioned secrets are not accessible from untrusted code. However, SGX does not
explicitly defend against software and hardware side-channels, and existing defenses against
are orthogonal to our work. We assume side-channel attacks are considered out-of-scope and
would apply solutions from the literature. Overall, these assumptions are in line with the
standard SGX threat and widely adopted by prior work [60].
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4.0 NEXUS
We present NeXUS, a stackable filesystem that leverages trusted hardware to provide
confidentiality and integrity for user files stored on untrusted platforms. NeXUS is explicitly
designed to balance security, portability, and performance: it supports dynamic sharing of
protected volumes on any platform exposing a file access API without requiring server-side
support, enables the use of fine-grained access control policies to allow for selective sharing, and
avoids the key revocation and file re-encryption overheads associated with other cryptographic
approaches to access control. This combination of features is made possible by the use of a
client-side Intel SGX enclave that is used to protect and share NeXUS volumes, ensuring
that cryptographic keys never leave enclave memory and obviating the need to re-encrypt files
upon revocation of access rights. We implemented two client-side NeXUS prototypes: AFS
and FUSE that allow unmodified user applications to access protected volumes as directories.
Although our AFS-based prototype required minimal changes to the AFS client for efficient
cache management, porting to FUSE demonstrates the generality of our design as well as
facilitate the migration of volumes across arbitrary filesystems. We provide stronger freshness
guarantees by maintaining a hash tree alongside the filesystem hierarchy to mitigate against
rollback attacks, without requiring direct communication between users. Our evaluation
reveals a ×2 overhead for a variety of interactive user workloads and improved portability
over AFS and Dropbox filesystems, while offering reasonable performance overheads when
comparing our FUSE prototype to the AFS implementation.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
File-sharing services such as Dropbox and Google Drive have received widespread adoption
in recent years [95, 4]. Through these services, users gain access to large amounts storage,
and can collaborate with sharing capabilities enforced by the service provider. However, the
recurrence of data breaches and unplanned disclosures has raised concerns about user privacy
on these platforms (e.g., [6, 8, 9]). Another source of concern is the fact that service providers
are legally permitted to modify and distribute sensitive data without requiring user discretion
(e.g., [14, 15, 16, 11]). Consequently, it is evermore critical to provide a security solution that
addresses these risks [96] as more users store sensitive information on these services.
Much research has been done to provide cryptographic access control over untrusted
storage. The canonical approach is to encrypt the file end-to-end, and distribute the encryption
key to authorized users. However, purely cryptographic access control solutions either require
server-side coordination, impose burdensome key management on users, or incur severe
bulk re-encryption overheads on access revocation [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. Recently,
other works have used trusted hardware to provide strong security primitives over untrusted
storage [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. However, these typically require trusted hardware on the server
or do not consider user sharing. This limits their applicability, especially when users cannot
readily modify the server-side components and consider dynamic sharing as an essential part
of their workflow.
We propose a practical security solution that: (1) allows for user deployment without
requiring any server-side coordination or trusted intermediary, (2) supports user sharing
with custom access controls, and (3) performs with comparable overheads on typical user
workloads. Our goal is to protect the confidentiality and integrity of a user’s files against
all untrusted parties, including unauthorized users, external attackers, and even the service
provider.
To address this need, we present NeXUS, a privacy-preserving filesystem that provides
cryptographically secure data storage and sharing on top of existing network-based storage
services. NeXUS is novel in that it leverages the Intel SGX extensions to provide efficient
access control and policy management, in a manner that is not possible using a software-based
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cryptographic approach. NeXUS allows users to add strong access controls to existing
unmodified and untrusted distributed data storage services to protect the confidentiality
and integrity of their data from both unauthorized users and the storage service itself, while
enabling sharing with authorized users. Data is protected through client-side cryptographic
operations implemented inside an SGX enclave. NeXUS embeds user-specified access
control policies into the files’ cryptographically protected metadata, which are decrypted by
the enclave for enforcement at access time. Therefore, unlike existing purely cryptographic
approaches to access control, revocations are efficient and do not require the bulk re-encryption
of file contents. Instead, the policies embedded in the smaller attached metadata are simply
updated and re-uploaded to the server.
NeXUS is user-centric, transparent, and requires no server-side changes. The aim is to
maintain the user workflow, as well as the functionality and benefits of the underlying storage
platform. NeXUS is implemented as a protection layer between users/applications and an
underlying filesystem, and leverages hardware security features (SGX) in order to securely
intercept and transform filesystem operations. Its two primary components are: (1) a secure
enclave that provides cryptographic and policy protections, and (2) a filesystem interface
layer that maps the generic filesystem API exported by the enclave to the actual underlying
storage platform. This approach allows NeXUS to present a standard hierarchical filesystem
view while supporting a broad range of underlying storage services such as remote filesystems
and distributed object stores.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
• We propose a novel client-side architecture that allows users to securely share files hosted
on untrusted cloud infrastructure. This architecture allows for efficient volume sharing
and access control policy changes. By performing all access controls and cryptographic
operations inside of a client-side enclave, NeXUS allows for seamless and secure key
distribution, minimal user key management, and efficient user revocation.
• NeXUS instantiates a distributed access control platform using trusted hardware. An SGX
enclave serves as a trusted reference monitor that executes independently on each client
machine rather than centrally on the (untrusted) server. This enables efficient cryptographic
access control without requiring server-side support.
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• We propose a cryptographic protocol that uses SGX remote attestation to enable secure
file sharing between users on different machines. Communication is completely in-band
and asynchronous, as it uses files on the underlying shared filesystem to exchange data and
does not require both users to be simultaneously online.
• We propose an optional rollback protection mechanism that prevents the server from
returning stale metadata. Our construction provides stronger freshness guarantees by
leveraging the filesystem hierarchy to maintain a hash tree within encrypted metadata
objects. Without requiring any direct user-to-user communication, our defenses ensure fork
consistency by limiting server equivocation attacks to a single occurrence.
• We implemented a NeXUS prototype that runs as a userspace daemon on top of the AFS,
a network filesystem popular with research and educational institutions. Without requiring
any server-side coordination or trusted intermediary, We modified the AFS client to allow
unmodified applications the ability to access protected volumes as AFS directories, whilst
cryptographically enforcing AFS ACLs at the directory level.
• We implemented another NeXUS prototype that runs as a standalone FUSE userspace
filesystem, and allows unmodified applications to access protected volumes from a mounted
directory. Compared to the AFS-based implementation, our FUSE prototype improves
portability by: (1) requiring no changes to the OS or underlying filesystem, and (2) enabling
the migration of volumes by simply copying its directory contents across filesystems.
• We evaluate NeXUS over two popular remote data stores, Dropbox and AFS. Using
microbenchmarks and other end-to-end latency tests, results show that NeXUS incurs
modest overheads on standard user workloads, supports a wide-range of Linux applications,
and obviates bulk re-encryption overheads typically associated with cryptographic solu-
tions. When compared to the AFS-based prototype, our FUSE implementation improves
portability and offers comparable performance characteristics.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides an account of our protection
model and the limitations of existing cryptographic solutions. In Section 4.3, we describe
the design of NeXUS, and Section 4.4 provides a prototype implementation. Respectively,
Section 4.5 describes the performance evaluations of the NeXUS prototype. We review






















Figure 7: Different architectures for enabling SGX security in a client-server environment.
Each architecture shows a different combination of enclave location and enclave provenance.
4.2 BACKGROUND AND PROTECTION MODEL
4.2.1 SGX Design Space
With its robust security primitives, SGX presents a wide range of options on deploying enclaves
within a cloud setting. Depending upon the security needs of the distributed application,
different considerations must be taken into account. Thus, we define the design space of
enclave deployment along the following dimensions: (1) Enclave provenance — whether the
enclave is owned by the client or the service provider and; (2) Enclave location — whether
the enclave is running on the client or the server.
Figure 7 shows all the possibilities within this design space. The service-enclave-on-server
(e.g., PESOS [34]) and service-enclave-on-client (e.g., EndBox [97]) collectively describe
Digital Rights Management (DRM) scenarios: access to data is controlled by the service
provider’s enclave. On the other hand, the client-enclave-on-server (e.g., Troxy [51]) denotes
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a scenario in which the client provisions enclaves on the server to achieve secure remote
computation. However, running the client enclave on the server has drawbacks. First, the
server must be equipped with SGX hardware which, at the time of this writing was only
offered by one major cloud provider (Microsoft Azure [98]). Second, a substantial amount
of server-side software may need to be retrofitted for SGX support. Depending upon the
system’s complexity, this may be a challenging task as changes could range from modifying
the client – server communication protocol, to including untrusted software components inside
the enclave [33, 99, 47, 34, 48]. On the other hand, the client-enclave-on-client scenario only
requires that the user trusts their local machine, and does not impose any server-side support
for its deployment. Moreover, this architecture enables a user-centric approach, such that the
enclave protects sensitive user information using a user-specified policy.
4.2.2 Cryptographic Filesystem Design
administrator






Figure 8: Architecture of a typical cryptographic filesystem. Encrypted file data are protected
by a lockbox, which are in turn cryptographically restricted to authorized users.
Cryptographic Filesystems employ encryption techniques to enforce access control on
untrusted storage. In this section, we construct a strawman filesystem and then discuss its
practical implications within a real-world environment.
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4.2.2.1 Strawman Construction Figure 8 depicts a closed-world model typical of
existing cryptographic filesystems in which the system consists of administrators, users, and
a storage provider [22, 17]. Administrators are responsible for managing users and group
membership operations. Users can read and write files, which are centrally stored by the
storage provider. Each user is assigned a public keypair, and must digitally sign every
operation. Although encryption provides confidentiality and integrity, it cannot prevent an
unauthorized user from overwriting data. Thus, we rely on a minimal server-side reference
monitor that serializes system writes and ensures data updates are from authorized users by
checking digital signatures. The aim is to ensure that file data and access control information
are only accessible to authorized users.
This construction realizes a simplified file sharing scenario in which read access to an
encrypted file is protected using lockbox (e.g., [21, 100]). File data is stored in an encrypted
form on the server, and the lockbox contains the file’s encryption key and the list of authorized
users. The lockbox is cryptographically protected, and access to the file encryption key could
be protected using Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), or Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE).
Thus, file access consists of recovering the file encryption key inside the lockbox with the
user’s private key, before decrypting the file contents.
4.2.2.2 Practical Implications Despite the simplicity of our strawman construction,
the revocation process requires: (i) re-encrypting the file with a new key, (ii) removing the
revoked user’s access from the filekey, and (iii) updating the other user entries to grant access
to the new file encryption key. This method is unsuitable for large files or updates impacting
multiple files. Moreover, given a large number of users in the filekey, the resulting overhead
could be prohibitive. These operations result from the fact that file decryption allows for
key-scraping attacks [101], whereby a user caches the file encryption key in anticipation of
future revocation. Although alternative approaches support re-encryption on the cloud, their
deployment model requires placing some trust on the server, have complex key management,
and exhibit asymptotic re-encryption costs.
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4.2.3 Our Approach
NeXUS combines the client-side encryption model used by existing cryptographic filesystems
with SGX security guarantees. Shown in Figure 7d, NeXUS adopts the client-enclave-
on-client architecture to encrypt data on the local machine before uploading the resulting
ciphertext onto the server. The idea is to have every client run NeXUS locally and then
leverage the aforementioned SGX features to form a secure key distribution system. On the
local machine, all cryptographic data protection is performed within an enclave (Isolated
Execution), and keys are persisted to disk using SGX facilities (Sealed Storage). Then, before
sharing keys with authorized users, we ensure the exchange occurs between valid NeXUS
enclaves running on genuine SGX processors (Remote Attestation). As a result, encryption
keys are never leaked to untrusted memory, and as such, kept under the complete control of
the NeXUS enclave.
We explore a deployment model that targets applications generating sensitive data
exclusively at the client and rely on a remote server as a storage provider. In the case of
distributed filesystems, the user’s file contents are opaque to the server, which we assume
can access, modify, and disseminate any file that it stores [14, 15, 16]. To protect each
file, we encrypt its contents and attach cryptographically-protected metadata containing
access control policy along with key material that can only be accessed using a valid NeXUS
enclave. The benefits are two-fold: (i) our solution can be easily deployed without any
out-of-band setup, file synchronization service implicitly provides key distribution, and (ii)
users maintain control over their data and decide on who is authorized to access its contents.
As SGX-enabled machines come to reach more end-users, we expect this client-side approach
to user-centric access control to become increasingly mainstream.
4.3 SYSTEM DESIGN
4.3.1 Design Goals
In designing NeXUS, we balanced security and ease of use with the following aims:
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1. Practicality. After the initial setup, the user should be able to access their data using
their typical workflow. NeXUS should be simple and impose minimal key management
on the user. Also, throughout its execution, the overheads imposed by NeXUS should not
significantly degrade the system’s performance.
2. Portability. All changes required to run NeXUS must occur on the client. NeXUS
should allow users to either store data locally or on a remote storage platform. This
implies no server-side coordination and the use of the underlying filesystem as the NeXUS
metadata store.
This approach closely follows the direction taken by existing cryptographic filesystems
(e.g., [24, 26, 21]). Our goal is to offer similar protections with superior key management,
efficient revocation, and no server-side participation. It is important to note that NeXUS is
not a full-blown standalone filesystem, but is designed as a security layer over an existing
host filesystem. To minimize our TCB, it is essential for the trusted portion of NeXUS to
be small, and its interface minimal. Our solution must be transparent and adaptable, such
that users can access their protected files without having to update their applications, and
integrating with various filesystems should be possible with moderate effort. Moreover, the
distribution of generated metadata should not require the deployment of additional services.
Instead, our solution should allow the user to use their available storage for both file data
and metadata.
Access Control. NeXUS should adopt a standard discretionary approach to access
control in which object owners can specify custom access control policies to dictate file
access permissions selectively. NeXUS must support standard file access rights such as read
and write. Administrative control over a file’s access permission should remain with the
owner, and enforcement must occur without the cooperation of the (untrusted) storage service
provider. To achieve this, NeXUS must internalize access control information as part of
the filesystem state, and enforce access control policies inside the NeXUS TCB. Finally,
NeXUS must ensure that the unencrypted data contents never leave the TCB unless the
access control policy allows it.
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4.3.2 High-Level Architecture
In order to meet the objectives outlined in Section 4.3.1, we have designed NeXUS to allow
users transparent security protections on existing file storage services. NeXUS presents
to the user a regular filesytem directory based on a protected volume. In order to ensure
that the structure and contents of each volume are only visible to authorized users, NeXUS
internally manages the volume layout in addition to the user’s data. The entirety of the
volume state is stored as a collection of data and metadata objects that are managed by
NeXUS, and tracked using universally unique identifiers (UUIDs). Each object is stored as a
regular data file on the underlying storage service using its UUID as the filename. In effect,
NeXUS implements a virtual filesystem on top of the underlying target filesystem. Figure 9
shows a high-level NeXUS configuration.
Accessing data from a NeXUS volume consists of the user issuing filesystem requests
that are intercepted by NeXUS and translated into a series of metadata and data operations
that are dispatched to the underlying storage service as file operations from the NeXUS
enclave. The data retrieved from the underlying storage service is then routed to the enclave
where it is decrypted and either returned as part of the original request (data) or used
to drive further enclave operations (metadata). Because NeXUS internally implements a
standard hierarchical filesystem in its metadata structures, this allows NeXUS to be portable
across a wide range of storage service architectures. Both data and metadata are stored
as self-contained objects in NeXUS, thus allowing them to be stored on a wide variety of
storage services (including object-based storage services).
The linchpin of data confidentiality and integrity in NeXUS is an enclave-generated
symmetric encryption key called the volume rootkey. This rootkey allows a NeXUS enclave
to decrypt the volume state and all other encryption keys used to encrypt volume objects
individually. Since the enclave creates it, NeXUS can to access the rootkey only when running
inside a restricted enclave environment. When the NeXUS enclave is not running, the rootkey
is sealed using SGX (Section 2.3.2) and stored on the local filesystem in an encrypted state
that can only be decrypted from inside the NeXUS enclave running on the same machine
























Figure 9: NeXUS architecture.
NeXUS enclave, which is also able to apply the file’s access control policy before exposing
the data to the user (Section 4.3.5). In this way, even should a user obtain a copy of the
enclave and a valid rootkey for a volume, they would still be unable to access the protected
data unless they also possessed a valid identity that had been granted access permissions.
With this approach, NeXUS can to provide sharing capabilities (Section 4.3.5) using SGX
remote attestation (Section 2.3.3), where the rootkey may be accessible to multiple users
while still maintaining per-file access controls that limit access to a subset of those users.
4.3.3 Filesystem Interface
Users access data in NeXUS using standard filesystem interfaces, which are translated into a
set of generic API calls implemented by the NeXUS enclave. This API is shown in Table 2,
and consists of 9 operations: 7 directory operations and 2 file operations. Each operation takes
as a target a file or directory stored inside the NeXUS volume. Each target is represented as
a metadata object stored by NeXUS, as well as a potential data object in the case of file




nexus_fs_create() Creates a new file/directory
nexus_fs_remove() Deletes file/directory
nexus_fs_lookup() Finds a file by name
nexus_fs_stat() Returns stat information
nexus_fs_symlink() Creates a symlink
nexus_fs_hardlink() Creates a hardlink
nexus_fs_rename() Moves a file
File Operations
nexus_fs_encrypt() Encrypts a file contents
nexus_fs_decrypt() Decrypts a file contents
Table 2: NeXUS Filesystem API. The arguments typically include the directory path(s),
and file name(s).
decrypting and performing access control checks at each layer. This method has the side
effect of turning single operations in multiple potential operations on the underlying storage
service. While this does introduce additional overheads, we show that these are acceptable
for most use cases. Moreover, NeXUS contains several performance optimizations to limit
the impact of these overheads (Section 4.4).
4.3.3.1 Metadata Structures Figure 10 gives a high-level overview of the structure of































Figure 10: Authenticated user view. Directory traversal by NeXUS to present the plain
contents of the user’s data files.
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metadata files alongside the encrypted data files using obfuscated names. These obfuscated
names consist of a globally unique 16-byte ID (UUID), that is tracked by the metadata
structures. The UUIDs are randomly generated within the enclave at metadata creation and
are universally unique across all machines. The unencrypted view of the filesystem (seen on
the right side of Figure 10) is only accessible by decrypting the metadata inside the NeXUS
enclave. The metadata not only store the filesystem layout, but also the cryptographic keys
and access control policies needed to ensure that the filesystem data is confidential and
tamper-evident.
The metadata structures implement a standard hierarchical filesystem namespace. Each
NeXUS filesystem is specified by a supernode (corresponding to a superblock in a normal
filesystem). The filesystem hierarchy is then implemented using a set of dirnodes (correspond-
ing to dentries) and filenodes (corresponding to inodes).
• Supernode: A supernode defines the context of a single NeXUS volume. The supernode
structure stores the UUID of the filesystem’s root directory along with the identity (public
key) of the filesystem’s owner. It also contains a list of other user identities that have
been granted access to the filesystem by the owner. These identities consist of a user
name along with an associated public key that is used for authentication. The owner of a
filesystem is immutable. However, the owner can add and remove authorized users at any
time. Moreover, the supernode also stores a hardlink table that maintains the UUID of files
with multiple links. The hardlink table consists of (UUID, link count) entries.
• Dirnode: Dirnodes represent directories in a NeXUS file system. Each dirnode contains
a list of directory contents consisting of a mapping between file/directory names and their
UUIDs. It is important to note that each UUID in a dirnode only references other metadata
files, and never directly references an actual data file. In NeXUS, because access control
is maintained at the directory level, the dirnode also stores the directory’s access control
policy.
• Filenode: Filenodes store the metadata that is necessary to access the data files stored in
NeXUS. Also, each filenode stores the cryptographic keys needed to encrypt/decrypt the
file contents. To support efficient random file access, NeXUS divides each data file into a
set of fixed-sized chunks, each of which is encrypted with an independent cryptographic
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Figure 11: Metadata Layout. The encryption key is protected with the volume rootkey, which
is only accessible within the enclave.
context. These contexts are stored as an array in the filenode structure with the UUID
corresponding to the actual data file.
4.3.3.2 Metadata Encryption Figure 11 depicts the general layout of a metadata
structure consists of three components, each of which has a different degree of cryptographic
protection.
(1) A preamble that stores non-sensitive information (e.g., UUID, size). This section is
integrity-protected.
(2) A cryptographic context containing the information used to secure metadata contents. It
has a 128-bit encryption key, an initialization vector, and an authentication tag. This
section is integrity-protected, and the encryption key is stored in keywrapped form for
confidentiality.
(3) A section where the metadata’s sensitive information is stored. This section is encrypted
and integrity-protected using the unique metadata key stored in (2).
Encryption of the metadata file occurs on every update, and is performed within the
enclave in two stages. After generating a fresh encryption key and IV inside the cryptographic
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context from (2), the first stage of encryption is performed using the AES-GCM cipher
with metadata section (3) as input, and the other two sections as additional authenticated
material. This operation outputs an authentication tag, which is copied into (2). The second
stage involves a keywrapping scheme that uses the volume’s rootkey to encrypt the freshly
generated key. We use the GCM-SIV [102] AEAD construction, and refer the reader for a
more in-depth discussion on keywrapping.
The metadata is protected using its cryptographic context which, in turn, is protected
using the rootkey. This approach simplifies key management,as it embeds every encryption
key within its corresponding metadata. Therefore, to access a volume, an user only needs to
store the volume’s sealed rootkey, which can only be unsealed within the NeXUS enclave
running on the particular platform.
4.3.3.3 Metadata Traversal Because a NeXUS volume is just a normal directory, if
directly accessed by the user, the files will be encrypted and bear obfuscated names. Therefore,
to expose this protected state — i.e., plain content and human-readable filenames — NeXUS
has to translate each local filesystem request into the corresponding metadata. Figure 10
shows the metadata traversal to access bar/cake.c. We abstracted all metadata operations
into a simple primary-key only interface that provides access to metadata using a UUID.
Initially, the root dirnode is loaded using the root directory’s UUID stored in the supernode.
Then, for each path component, the current dirnode’s directory list is used to lookup the
UUID of the next dirnode. As each metadata object is read into trusted memory, the enclave
uses the volume rootkey to decrypt and verify its contents. Before performing the lookup,
the enclave also checks the UUID field of the loaded dirnode matches the value in its parent.
By ensuring we load the correct metadata, we guard against file swapping attacks [26] that
threaten the integrity of the filesystem structure (Section 6). If the verification or lookup
operation fails, the metadata traversal terminates. Otherwise, the final metadata object is
returned.
4.3.3.4 Virtual Filesystem Operations We now describe how the NeXUS enclave
orchestrates the metadata structures to implement the Filesystem API in Table 2. Each API
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call takes a target path, which is traversed in order to fetch metadata. The enclave then
invokes a handler with the metadata to perform the filesystem operation. On completion, all
modified metadata are committed to network storage, and the enclave output is returned to
the untrusted caller. We assume that the enclave virtual filesystem is single-threaded, and does
not support concurrent requests from multiple threads (left for future work). For simplicity,
we omit details on basic filesystem checks (e.g., checking if the directory is non-empty before
deleting its metadata).
• create(): This operation creates a file/directory. For example, consider creating foo.txt
in the root directory (Figure 9). We first check that file name is not present inside the root
dirnode. After generating a UUID, the enclave inserts a new (name, UUID) pair into the
root dirnode, and creates the child (filenode) metadata.
• remove(): This operation removes a file/directory by name inside the parent dirnode and
also deletes the corresponding filenode/dirnode metadata. If the entry is a file, we check
for other links using the hardlink table before deleting the filenode metadata. If multiple
links exist, we decrement its link count within the hardlink table and keep the filenode
metadata.
• lookup()/stat(): Common filesystem calls used for checking if a file/directory exists.
• symlink(): A symlink is a shortcut to a target file. This creates a (name, symlink target)
entry in the dirnode.
• hardlink(): Hardlinks associate a name with a file. This increments the file’s link count
inside the hardlink table.
• rename(): Renaming takes four arguments: the source directory, the target directory, the
old name, and the new name. The old name is removed from the source dirnode, and the
new name is added to the target dirnode. Note that the renamed entry still points to the
same metadata.
• encrypt()/decrypt(): Encrypt and decrypt are used to write and read files, respectively.
The required arguments include the file path, offset, and a buffer to hold the file data.
After fetching the filenode metadata, the offset is used to find the chunk entry that contains
cryptographic material. The file contents are then encrypted/decrypted inside the enclave,





m = SIGN(sku, nonce|supernode) - decrypt supernode









{ pku, sku }
Figure 12: User Authentication with NeXUS enclave
These provide the minimum set of operations for interfacing with a fully functional
filesystem API such as FUSE (Section 4.4.2). Note that to operate as a secure filesystem,
NeXUS performs necessary access control checks prior to executing any of these functions
(Section 4.3.5).
4.3.4 Authentication and User Sharing
To access a NeXUS volume, a user must first be authenticated to a NeXUS enclave in order
to be granted access to the filesystem’s rootkey. While the rootkey allows a user to launch a
NeXUS instance for a particular volume, it does not automatically grant access to the data
stored in that volume. For that, the NeXUS enclave performs a second step ensuring that
the identity used to authenticate into the volume is authorized by the access control policies
stored in the file’s metadata.
In NeXUS, identity is established using public-private keypairs, where each authorized
user’s public key is stored inside the supernode metadata file. Each identity has an associated
user ID that is used in the access control policies maintained by the dirnodes. With this,
authenticating into a volume involves the following challenge-response protocol (Figure 12):
1. The user requests to authenticate by making a call into the NeXUS enclave with their
public key (pku) and the sealed volume rootkey as arguments.
2. Inside the enclave, the rootkey is unsealed. Then, a random 128-bit nonce is generated,
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and returned to the calling user.
3. The user then uses their private key to create a signature over the encrypted supernode
structure of the volume and the enclave nonce. This signature and the encrypted supernode
are then passed to the enclave.
4. Inside the enclave, the volume rootkey is used to decrypt and verify the supernode. After
finding the user’s entry inside the supernode, the enclave then validates the signature with
the user’s public key.
5. On success, the user’s ID is cached inside the enclave.
This protocol establishes that (i) the user as the owner of the public key stored (via
signature verification), (ii) the user has been granted access to the volume (via the presence
of their public key in the supernode), and (iii) the supernode itself has not been modified
(via metadata protection). Once authorized, the volume is mounted and becomes available.
4.3.4.1 User Sharing Sharing data with NeXUS is complicated by the fact that SGX
generates a unique sealing key on each machine. This means that a sealed rootkey cannot
simply be passed between enclaves when a new user is granted permission to access a volume,
or when an authorized user accesses a volume using a new machine. At the same time, the
rootkey cannot be encrypted with a key available outside of the enclave context (e.g., a user’s
public key) without compromising the volume’s security. To overcome this challenge, we
incorporated a key exchange protocol that allows a volume’s rootkey to be distributed to
remote NeXUS instances, while ensuring that it will only be accessible from within a NeXUS
enclave. This protocol relies on an Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellmann (ECDH) key exchange
combined with enclave attestation features available in SGX. All messages are communicated
in-band using the underlying storage service to exchange data between endpoints.
Consider the case where a NeXUS volume owner, Owen, wishes to grant access to his
volume to Alice. The end result of the protocol will be that Alice has a locally sealed version
of the rootkey for Owen’s NeXUS volume, and Alice’s public key will be present in list of
users stored inside the volume’s supernode. We assume that Alice’s public key is available
to Owen via some external mechanism (e.g., as in SSH). The endpoints of the protocol are






{pk_eo, sk_eo} <- PKGEN()
Q1 = QUOTE(pk_eo)
m1 = SIGN(sk_o, Q1) | pk_eo
{pk_ea, sk_ea} <- PKGEN()
Q1 = QUOTE(pk_ea)
m1 = SIGN(sk_a, Q1) | pk_ea
Server
VERIFY_QUOTE(Q1’)
{pk_eph, sk_eph} <- PKGEN()
k <- ECDH_SECRET(sk_eph, pk_ea)
h = ENC(k, rootkey)




k’ <- ECDH_SECRET(sk_ea, pk_eph)






Figure 13: Key Exchange protocol diagram for Owen sharing his NeXUS volume rootkey
with Alice.
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1. Setup: As part of the initialization process of a NeXUS volume, an ECDH keypair (pke, ske)
is generated inside the NeXUS enclave. The private key is only ever accessible inside the
enclave, and is encrypted with the enclave sealing key before being stored persistently. To
export the public key, the user generates an enclave quote supplying the public key as
authenticated data. This quote identifies the user’s enclave and cryptographically binds
the ECDH public to the enclave. The quote is signed with the owner’s private key, and
then stored on the underlying storage service in a location that is accessible to the other
users in the system.
Q = QUOTE(pke)
m1 = SIGN(sku, Q) | pke
Where {pku, sku} is the volume owner’s public keypair and Q is the enclave quote with
the enclave ECDH public key, pke, as authentication data.
2. Exchange: Whenever Owen wishes to grant Alice access to his file system, he must
transfer a copy of his volume rootkey to Alice. To do this, Owen first validates the quote
generated from Alice’s enclave (by checking that the signature matches Alice’s public key
and verifying the quote with Intel), before extracting the enclosed enclave public key, pkea.
Then, within the enclave, Owen generates an ephemeral ECDH keypair (pkeph, skeph), and
combines it with pkea to derive a common secret that encrypts his volume rootkey. The
encrypted rootkey and the ephemeral ECDH public key (the private portion is discarded)
are signed using Owen’s private key and stored on the underlying storage service in a
location that is accessible to Alice.
k ← ECDH_SECRET(skeph, pkea)
h = ENC(k, rootkey)
m2 = SIGN(sko, h) | pkeph
3. Extraction: Alice first validates Owen’s signature and then, using the enclave private key,
she derives the ECDH secret and decrypts the rootkey.
k ← ECDH_SECRET(skea, pkeph)
rootkey = DEC(k, h)
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Since the ECDH secret can only be derived within the enclave, our protocol ensures the
rootkey is only accessible within valid NeXUS enclaves. The rootkey can then be sealed and
stored to Alice’s local disk. Later, once Alice authenticates, she can decide to mount Owen’s
volume using the corresponding rootkey.
4.3.5 Access Control
Even after a user has been granted access to a volume’s rootkey, access to files within the
volume is further restricted via access control policies enforced by the NeXUS enclave. Access
control is based on: (i) the user’s identity as specified by the private key they authenticated
with, (ii) the permissions stored in the respective metadata. With this, access control
enforcement is independent of the server, and because the metadata is encrypted and sealed,
the access policies cannot be viewed nor undetectably tampered.
We implemented a typical Access Control List (ACL) scheme in which users have unique
IDs mapped to (username, public key) pairs, and permissions apply to all files (and subdirec-
tories) within a directory. We leveraged the user list in the supernode to bind every user to a
unique ID, and store the directory ACLs comprising of (user ID, permission) tuples in the
encrypted portion of the dirnode. Hence, to enforce access control within a given directory:
• The dirnode metadata is decrypted inside the enclave.
• If the current user is the owner of the volume, permission is granted to the user and the
enclave exits.
• Otherwise, the user’s ID is used to find the corresponding ACL entry inside the dirnode.
Authorization is granted if the user’s ACL matches the requested permission.
NeXUS denies access by default and automatically grants administrative rights to the volume
owner, who maintains complete control over their volume. Revoking a user is performed
either by removing them from the user list, or removing their ACL entry from the dirnode. In
































Figure 14: Metadata update after writing to bar/cake.c (right). After propagating the
MAC values to the root dirnode, the root MAC and version are then stashed locally.
4.3.6 Rollback Protection
NeXUS provides data confidentiality and integrity by enclosing the filesystem state within
encrypted metadata. However, this does not prevent Rollback Attacks in which the server
or attacker returns older metadata versions to the user. Since these metadata are still
cryptographically valid, the enclave will successfully decrypt and integrity-check their contents.
Thus, without strong freshness guarantees, an attacker could trick the enclave into using a
stale or inconsistent filesystem state.
NeXUS prevents rollback attacks by maintaining a hash tree alongside the filesystem
hierarchy. A typical hash tree implementation involves hashing the sibling nodes (i.e., contents
of a directory) together to create a super hash, which is then stored in the parent node (i.e.,
dirnode). The digest of the entire tree results in a root hash, which is stored to a secure
location (e.g., local client machine). This way, data integrity only requires verifying the root
hash and each hash down to a leaf node. We employ a similar strategy by using the NeXUS
filesystem hierarchy as a tree. The hierarchy is made of dirnode and filenode metadata, which
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store directory and file content respectively. Also, the root dirnode sits at the top of the
hierarchy, dirnodes can have other dirnodes and filenodes as children, and filenodes have no
children. Our scheme consists in ensuring that the integrity of each metadata is a function of
its content and that of its children. Thus, we extend dirnode’s directory entries with a MAC
field that is managed as follows:
4.3.6.1 Verifying Metadata Every client maintains a local copy of the root hash and
its version, which correspond to the MAC and version of the volume’s root dirnode. After
successfully decrypting any metadata, we verify its MAC as follows:
• For the root dirnode, we first check its MAC against the local root hash value. On failure,
we then compare the fetched metadata’s version against the local stashed value. If newer,
the local root dirnode version and MAC are updated, otherwise the process is aborted.
• For other metadata, their MAC value is checked against their directory entry inside their
parent metadata.
4.3.6.2 Updating Metadata We update the MAC value of the directory entry whenever
its corresponding metadata is re-encrypted (e.g., file creation/deletion). For example, consider
the series of metadata updates when a user writes to bar/cake.c (Figure 14). First, the
cake.c filenode is re-encrypted and its new MAC is updated inside its corresponding directory
entry in bar/. Then, the process is repeated for bar/, which updates its directory entry
inside the root dirnode. Finally, after re-encrypting the root dirnode, its MAC and version
are stashed into a local file as the root hash.
In addition to ensuring the freshness of individual dirnode or filenode metadata, the
above process also protects the hierarchy from root dirnode to leaf dirnode/filenode. In
NeXUS, the filesystem structure stores an ordered list of entries in the dirnodes and restricts
every file/directory to a single parent metadata. For directories and files with a single link,
this is simply the parent dirnode. However, because hardlink files are allowed in different
directories, they can be updated through multiple paths and cause a potential mismatch at
verification. Thus, we extended the hardlink table with a MAC field for each entry, such that
when updating or verifying a file with multiple links, the hardlink table is used as the parent
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metadata. As a result, the path to any metadata is unique, thereby allowing the formation
of a tree alongside the filesystem hierarchy.
4.4 IMPLEMENTATION
We developed NeXUS as a userspace application that leverages the SGX SDK to securely
access protected volumes. We first explain the overall architecture and provide details on the
enclave implementation. Then, after describing how NeXUS was ported to run atop FUSE,
we complete the section with our data consistency measures and some runtime optimizations.
Our prototypes act as a stackable layer interposed between user applications and the host
filesystem. NeXUS is split into an untrusted portion (11200 SLOC) that runs in normal
userspace, and a trusted portion that runs inside the enclave (9161 SLOC). The untrusted
portion mainly implements the NeXUS filesystem API and facilitates enclave access to
metadata via the storage API. The trusted portion performs secure operations, including key
management, metadata encryption, and access enforcement.
The NeXUS enclave is designed to be minimalistic; its small codebase amounts to a 912
KB binary size, which allows for verification by modern model checkers. Additionally, this
small size ensures the NeXUS enclave can easily fit into the limited 96 MB enclave-reserved
memory and leaving enough memory for runtime allocations. For cryptographic support, we
included a subset of MbedTLS Library (216 KB binary), and a C-based implementation of
GCM-SIV key-wrapping construction [102]. The enclave interface comprises of 29 enclave
calls (ecalls) and 10 outside calls (ocalls). Ecalls invoke specific entry points within the
enclave, and are responsible for marshaling data into the enclave. Ocalls manage untrusted
memory and access data/metadata objects. To prevent inadvertent data leakage, we sanity-
check our inputs, ensure enclave pointer access is within trusted memory, and employ secure
data serializers on sensitive outputs. Specifically, every sensitive file or metadata content is
automatically encrypted and sealed using enclave-bound keys, before copying the resulting
ciphertext to untrusted memory.
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4.4.1 AFS Implementation
AFS is a distributed filesystem that relies on a set of trusted servers to provide transparent
access to user files over the network. We implemented NeXUS as a userspace Linux service
that extends OpenAFS [103] (the de facto open source AFS implementation) to manage
protected volumes on the network, without any modifications on the server-side or changes
in the user’s typical file management workflow. Our interface does not make any internal
modifications to OpenAFS, it simply calls the NeXUS filesystem API via a shimlayer. To
summarize our changes: (i) Because OpenAFS resides in kernel space, we added a device
driver that routes the AFS filesystem requests to the NeXUS userspace daemon; (ii) we
adapted the OpenAFS file chunking system to use the same chunk size as for seamless
interoperability during I/O operations; (iii) we set up a shared memory map region, directly
accessible from both kernel and userspace to enable the encryption of large files without any
extra copying; and (iv) we modified the AFS “fs setacl” utility in setting the access rights
of protected directories with AFS ACLs. Excluding third party libraries, our implementation
comprises about 22618 SLOC. Integrating with OpenAFS (90K SLOC) required about 3200
SLOC.
4.4.2 FUSE Filesystem
We portedNeXUS to run atop FUSE in about 2353 SLOC. FUSE is a cross-platform userspace
library that facilitates the development of filesystems via a simple API [104]. Its high-level
architecture consists of: (i) a kernel module that manages the FUSE filesystem, and (ii) the
libfuse user space library which communicates with the kernel module on each filesystem
request. FUSE allows NeXUS to expose a POSIX-like interface to client applications and
provide access to NeXUS volumes on a variety of local and remote filesystems without
requiring any server-side changes. As shown in our evaluation, NeXUS supports both AFS
and Dropbox with no modifications to their client applications, while allowing volumes to
be copied as directories across network filesystems. Our prototype intercepts filesystem
requests within a mounted directory and then invokes the corresponding NeXUS filesystem
API function for processing. To synchronize the FUSE filesystem view with the enclave, we
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maintain a directory structure of the filesystem state in untrusted memory. This structure is
updated on every lookup or stat. Moreover, NeXUS follows open-to-close I/O semantics by
performing all file writes on the local machine, and only committing changes on close().
Initially, we extended the OpenAFS client to develop a NeXUS prototype that manages
protected volumes on an AFS filesystem by simply routed network API calls from kernel space
to our NeXUS userspace application. Although relatively less portable, this approach allows
our prototype to benefit from the cache management and other kernel-level optimizations
provided by the AFS client. Overall, both AFS and FUSE prototypes require kernel to
userspace transitions as part of their data flow, but the AFS implementation only performs
that action when interacting with the network as it heavily caches data in kernel space.
Moreover, it is crucial to note that both implementations are largely unoptimized (maximum
local performance was not our principal aim), and were mainly developed to demonstrate the
adaptability of the NeXUS filesystem API.
4.4.3 Consistency Considerations
Because NeXUS manages metadata internally, every filesystem request triggers several I/O
requests to the underlying storage service. As a result, in the situation whereby multiple
users simultaneously access a file, a user’s NeXUS enclave might fetch an older version of
the metadata. To prevent this possible mismatch, on every filesystem request that updates
metadata (e.g., create, delete, rename), NeXUS locks metadata structures via the facilities
provided by the storage service. This locking is accomplished by invoking flock() on the
metadata file. Once the metadata is flushed to network storage, the lock is released, allowing
users to access the file. Note that locking is not required on read operations.
Moreover, enabling rollback protection in NeXUS requires maintaining hash-tree consis-
tency encoded across multiple metadata objects. Thus, on stateful filesystem operations, we
prevent write-write conflicts by locking metadata from root-to-leaf as part of the metadata
traversal. This lock order ensures that accessing and verifying metadata only occurs after its
ancestors are locked, but also locks the root dirnode. When the VFS operation is completed,
the metadata are flushed and released from leaf-to-root to ensure that parent metadata are
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updated after their children. Once the root dirnode is flushed, the lock is released to make it
available for other users. This mechanism has a tradeoff between security and sharing; the
user acquires strong integrity guarantees at the cost of concurrent volume modifications. We
explore the performance implications for maintaining this hash-tree in our evaluation.
4.4.4 Optimizations
For every filesystem request, the NeXUS enclave fetches one or more metadata objects from
the backing store to complete the operation. Because of the network latency, this makes
metadata-intensive operations cost prohibitive. To address this, we introduced several caches
to speedup data access, including a VFS-like directory cache structure (dentry tree) inside
the enclave, and caching the metadata locally (unencrypted in enclave memory, or encrypted
in untrusted memory). This way, unless a file is modified on the remote server, locally cached
information can be used to fulfill filesystem requests.
To improve performance on larger directories, we split dirnodes into independently-
encrypted buckets. Each bucket contains a user-configurable number of directory entries and
is stored as separate metadata objects. The main bucket stores the directory’s access control
and the MAC of each bucket to prevent rollback attacks at the bucket level. When writing
the dirnode to the underlying storage service, only the main bucket and other dirty buckets
are flushed.
By default, NeXUS commits all metadata changes to the network-backed storage. Al-
though essential for consistency, the network cost is unnecessary for non-interactive workloads
in which several operations are required to achieve the desired state. Examples include
extracting compressed archives and cloning a git repository. Thus, we developed a variant
of NeXUS that performs metadata I/O operations on a local directory, and not on the
underlying network filesystem. This batching mode of operation can be activated at runtime
by the user, who can readily commit the resultant filesystem state unto the server. This
runtime setting is geared towards metadata-intensive workloads during which user interaction
with the NeXUS volume is absent.
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4.5 EVALUATION
This section presents various performance benchmarks and real-world, end-to-end evaluation
of NeXUS. To achieve the design goals stated in Section 4.3.1, we chose the following criteria:
• Portability. Does the NeXUS prototype support various network filesystems? What of
user applications?
• Performance. Are the overheads incurred by NeXUS reasonable? How does it perform
on normal user workloads? What of bulk metadata workloads? How is rollback protection
affected by directory depth?
• Efficient Revocation. How cheap are user revocations when compared to purely crypto-
graphic implementations?
Experimental Setup. We evaluate NeXUS on an i7 @3.4GHz with 8GB RAM and 128MB
EPC, running SGX SDK 2.2 and Ubuntu 18.04 LTS. The experiments compare the overhead
of NeXUS (and its variants) against unmodified network-based filesystems, namely AFS
and Dropbox. Whereas AFS behaves like a full-fledged network filesystem by synchronously
committing local changes to the server (on the same LAN), Dropbox monitors changes in
a mounted folder and asynchronously uploads them to the cloud. In particular, although
Dropbox tries to minimize network latency (e.g., batching, chunking, compression), it is
sometimes affected by spurious delays and synchronization time takes longer than needed
(e.g., during frequent file updates [105, 106]). For the NeXUS prototype, we used 1MB file
chunks and 128-entry dirnode buckets. Moreover, our measurements are averaged over 10
runs.
4.5.1 Microbenchmarks
We ran two microbenchmarks to isolate the overheads imposed by NeXUS. We began with
measuring the latency of basic file I/O operations using a python program that reads and
writes a file at different sizes. Compared to AFS (Figure 15a) and Dropbox (Figure 15b),
results show that NeXUS incurs a negligible overhead across all file sizes. This is because
the runtime is dominated by file I/O, which is the same amount on each prototype. Although
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(a) AFS File I/O.













(b) Dropbox File I/O.


















(c) AFS directory operations.














(d) Dropbox directory operations.
Figure 15: Microbenchmarks comparing file and directory operations.
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Workload Total Size Native NeXUS Overhead
AFS
140 MP3s 150MB 2.91s 5.35s ×1.84
1 movie 650MB 9.35s 14.79s ×1.58
211 PDFs 315MB 7.61s 13.92s ×1.83
30 videos 1.6GB 24.78s 41.25s ×1.66
Dropbox
20 MP3 20MB 10.33s 21.59s ×2.09
1 movie 650MB 86.45s 94.82s ×1.09
211 PDFs 315MB 96.92s 71.83s ×0.74
30 videos 1.6GB 180.19s 216.90s ×1.20
Table 3: Latency(s) for copying PDFs and videos.
the metadata I/O by NeXUS increases as the filenode grows to accommodate additional file
chunks, this is still small compared to the file size (about 80B of filenode data for every 1MB
file chunk).
Next, we analyzed the performance of directory operations using another python program
that creates and deletes files within a flat directory. Compared to AFS (Figure 15c), the
overhead incurred by NeXUS increases with file count, meanwhile the overhead on Dropbox
(Figure 15d) remains less than ×2. This is because every file created increases the size of the
directory’s dirnode, which becomes considerably bigger than individual directory entries. For
large directories, this could result in significant performance overheads as the size discrepancy
between the directory entry and the dirnode becomes more pronounced.
4.5.2 Macrobenchmarks
We evaluate the end-to-end impact of NeXUS on copying various workloads, including MP3s,
PDFs and videos. To cover a wide range of user storage workloads, we vary the file count and
size to generate a unique mix of directory and file operations. The results in Table 3 show
that NeXUS incurs about a ×2 overhead on most workloads. In AFS, the 140 MP3s and 211
PDFs workloads incurred the highest overhead due to their larger directories. However, the
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Figure 16: Copying 150 MP3s at different directory depths.
single 650MB movie and the 1.6GB video collection had the lowest overhead on both AFS and
Dropbox. Because their runtime is dominated by file I/O, NeXUS processes them efficiently.
Surprisingly, NeXUS is 25% faster than Dropbox in synchronizing PDFs. We reran this
experiment multiple times, but it seems the workload’s I/O patterns benefit NeXUS.
4.5.3 Rollback Protection Overhead
In this test, we measure performance impact of providing rollback protection. First, we
extract the source code of the Julia programming language to initialize the directory hierarchy.
Then, we measure the latency of copying a music collection of 140 files (155MB) at different
directory depths. Figure 16 shows that on both AFS and Dropbox, the overhead incurred
by rollback protection (i.e., -htree) increases slightly with directory depth, whereas that of
plain NeXUS remains constant. This additional overhead is because -htree must lock and
update multiple metadata objects on each filesystem operation. Moreover, the results show
that this increase is relatively minimal.
4.5.4 Bulk Metadata Operations
We evaluate the performance of NeXUS on bulk metadata operations by cloning the git
repositories of Redis (618 files) and Julia (1096 files). Git cloning requires a series of filesystem




































Figure 17: Git cloning of Redis and Julia.
them into constituent files and directories. Figure 17 shows the latency measurements. For
both Redis and Julia, the NeXUS overheads on AFS and Dropbox are ×2.9 and ×1.2,
respectively. Meanwhile, the -htree prototype incurs slightly higher overheads as it requires
additional metadata I/O to provide data freshness. However, when combined with batch
mode (i.e., ?-batch), the overhead drops on both AFS and Dropbox. The is due to the fact
that fewer filesystem operations are propagated to network, thereby reducing overall latency.
4.5.5 Revocation Estimates
NeXUS supports two types of revocation: (1) removing a user from the volume, and (2)
removing a user’s rights from a directory. In a typical cryptographic filesystem, revoking user
access involves the following steps: re-encrypting the affected file(s), uploading the ciphertext
to the server, and then distributing the new keys to authorized users. Because NeXUS
ensures encryption keys never escape the enclave boundary, revocation becomes as simple
as re-encrypting the metadata with a new key. For instance, consider the scenario in which
a user is revoked from the directory containing the 211 PDFs workload mentioned above
(Figure 16). For 315MB of file data, the NeXUS will have to re-encrypt and update about
653KB of metadata (recall access control is stored in the dirnode). Whereas, in the 30 videos
workload, the metadata payload drops to 210KB for 1.6GB of file data.
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Operation AFS NeXUS-AFS NeXUS-FUSE
LevelDB
Fillseq 10.5 MB/s 8.1 MB/s 8.5 MB/s
Fillsync 2.2 µs/op 4.5 µs/op 10 µs/op
Fillrandom 5.9 MB/s 3.7 MB/s 4.6 MB/s
Overwrite 4.0 MB/s 2.6 MB/s 3.4 MB/s
Readseq 664.6 MB/s 718.1 MB/s 673.9 MB/s
Readreverse 425.0 MB/s 425.7 MB/s 429.8 MB/s
Readrandom 2.27 µs/op 3.7 µs/op 2.3 µs/op
Fill100K 11.0 MB/s 7.2 MB/s 10.7 MB/s
SQLITE
Fillseq 6.5 MB/s 6.4 MB/s 3.1 MB/s
Fillseqsync 14.4 µs/op 31.4 µs/op 37.3 µs/op
Fillseqbatch 70.2 MB/s 69.7 MB/s 49.5 MB/s
Fillrandom 4.2 MB/s 4.2 MB/s 2.2 MB/s
Fillrandsync 13.4 µs/op 31.2 µs/op 45.3 µs/op
Fillrandbatch 7.6 MB/s 7.7 MB/s 4.1 MB/s
Overwrite 3.4 MB/s 3.4 MB/s 1.8 MB/s
Table 4: Database benchmark results on AFS.
4.5.6 Comparing FUSE Overhead
We compare the performance of our FUSE-based prototype with another NeXUS imple-
mentation that required modifying the AFS client [107]. FUSE provides better portability
and does not require any changes to the underlying filesystem. However on every filesystem
request, FUSE incur overheads from transitioning and copying data between the kernel
and userspace. Whereas, the AFS-based prototype only transitions from the kernel to our
userspace NeXUS daemon on network API calls, but manages caching and other low level
operations inside the kernel.
For this test, we ran the database benchmarks of LevelDB and SQLite, two embeddable
database engines commonly used to provide a data layer. Using 4 MB of cache memory, each
benchmark generates several database files to emulate a key-value store of 16-byte keys and
100-byte values. The latency of various database operations was measured and displayed in
Table 4. Results show that both NeXUS variants performed similar to vanilla AFS on most
59
asynchronous operations. Because the database utility does not wait for the operation to
complete, the effect of each filesystem call is amortized. However, synchronous operations
incurred significant overhead on both prototypes, with NeXUS-AFS being significantly faster
due to less transitioning and copying compared to FUSE. However, as shown by the previous
tests, FUSE allows more general filesystem support, and does not require any changes to the
OS or any other system components.
4.5.7 Takeaway Discussion
The results of our evaluation demonstrate the ability of NeXUS to meet the demands of
standard user workloads. While our approach does necessarily introduce additional overheads,
these are predominately encountered during metadata modifying operations that generally do
not fall on the critical path for most personal data workloads. In general, interactive programs
exhibit less than ×2 performance degradation on writes, which we believe is acceptable in
practice for the majority of users. We envision that users of typical file sharing platforms will
mostly perform reads, and manage relatively small workloads such as text documents and
photos [108]. Alternatively, NeXUS supports a batch mode that allows users to speed up
the execution of bulk metadata workloads.
Moreover, NeXUS is designed to operate within a multi-user environment that offers
standard file sharing capabilities. Although our evaluation occurs within a single machine, we
document the costs of providing sharing as follows: (i) The asynchronous rootkey exchange
(Section 4.3.4) requires a single file write. (ii) Adding/removing users (Section 4.3.5) is not
unlike revocation, which has been shown to require a single metadata update. (iii) Although
policy enforcement (Section 4.3.5) scales with the number of ACL entries, its cost is dominated




Since its release, SGX has generated considerable research aimed at achieving secure remote
storage [34, 33, 36, 48, 109, 35]. LibSEAL [48] detects cloud provider integrity violations by
creating a non-repudiable log of the service requests and responses. BesFS [110] provides
a formally-verified filesystem API that protects enclave applications against Iago attacks.
PESOS [34] enforces custom server-side access control on top of untrusted storage, but
its prototype requires a LibOS [58] that severely impacts the TCB. SPEICHER [37] and
eLSM [109] provide secure key-value stores. ZeroTrace [36] and OBLIVIATE [33] use an
ORAM protocol to protect file contents and access patterns from the server, but do not
consider file sharing. Moreover, because these solutions require server-side SGX support,
they have limited applicability in the personal cloud storage setting. We circumvent this by
running the NeXUS enclave on the client, while taking into account the practicalities of
dynamic user sharing and seamless integration with existing storage services. SGX-FS [35] is
an enclave-protected userspace filesystem, but does not provide any sharing capabilities.
IBBE-SGX [32] and A-SKY [111] propose a computationally efficient schemes for achieving
scalable access control an enclave. However, unlike NeXUS, their access control models
restrict all group membership operations to the administrator.
4.6.2 Cryptographic Filesystems
Starting with CFS [112], TCFS [113], NCryptfs [114], a long line of work has been dedicated
to employing client-side encryption to secure remote untrusted storage [115, 116]. Most of
them either assume a trusted server, or require deploying semi-trusted intermediaries. Latter
systems such as [24, 26, 21] took a closer regard to file sharing, and proposed schemes that
rely on clients to manage the encryption keys. Unfortunately, pure encryption techniques
are plagued by issues of non-trivial key management and bulk file re-encryption on user
revocation. These overheads could be considerable, even with modest policy updates [17].
Although mitigating schemes such as lazy encryption (delay file re-encryption until the next
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write [117]) and proxy re-encryption (use a trusted server for key distribution [19]) have been
proposed, concerns remain on how practical they perform under real world environments. By
having the NeXUS enclave mediate access to all encryption keys, we offer superior user key
management and obviate the necessity of bulk file re-encryption on policy updates.
Another line of research has focused on providing stronger integrity protections to remotely
hosted data [116, 118]. In a rollback attack, the server returns stale versions of the data to
the user. Fork consistency [116] is the strongest form of consistency achievable without direct
client communication; it ensures that the filesystem state observed by the user is derived
from a valid sequence of changes. Specifically, if the server equivocated and presented each
client with a different view of their data, they can never see each other’s further changes. If
the clients were to communicate with each other offline, they will detect the equivocation.
This requires the use of authenticated data structures (e.g., Merkle trees or hash chains) that
provide efficient integrity-protection over a collection of items [100]. However, because of the
network and concurrency costs involved in maintaining these structures, existing solutions
either rely on server-side participation, use a byzantine fault-tolerance protocol, or restrict
themselves to a single-user setting [115, 119, 120]. Verena relies on a trusted server to enable
efficient integrity verification of webpages by clients.
4.7 CONCLUSIONS
The protection of user data on cloud storage remains an active research area; however, existing
works either require substantial changes to server/client or impose severe data management
burdens on the user. As a solution, we presented NeXUS, a stackable filesystem that protects
files on untrusted storage while providing secure file sharing under fine-grained access control.
NeXUS is a performant and practical solution: it requires no server-side changes and imposes
minimal key management on users. NeXUS uses an SGX enclave to encrypt sensitive data on
the client and then attaches cryptographically-protected metadata that ensures the encryption
keys are enclave-bound. Furthermore, NeXUS provides confidentiality and integrity of file
data, as well as file and directory names. NeXUS also provides optional rollback protection
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to detect when the server returns stale metadata while also enforcing access control at each
user’s local machine enabling file sharing through SGX remote attestation. Finally, we
implemented a FUSE-based prototype that runs on top of AFS and Dropbox. Our evaluation
shows that NeXUS achieves good performance in file I/O operations and incurs modest
overheads on workloads that involved bulk metadata.
However, our current access control implementation only supports simple ACLs, which
are evaluated using simple checks, and does not take into account the environmental context.
Futhermore, traditional access control schemes do not take into account changes in the access
context, especially as usage occurs on remote client machines and extend over large time
periods. In the next chapter, we extend the NeXUS design to implement fine-grained access
and usage control within a large-scale cloud environment.
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5.0 JOPLIN
We present Joplin, a secure access and usage control system that provides confidentiality
and integrity on top of existing cloud storage systems. Joplin leverages trusted hardware to
address the practical challenges of attribute-based access control, including efficient revocation,
multi-domain policies, and secure user delegation. This is enabled by a client-side enclave that
hosts a policy interpreter, and applies cryptographic protections without leaking encryption
keys. Joplin embeds user-specified policies within encrypted metadata, which are decrypted
within the enclave for continuous enforcement at access time. We implemented a prototype
by extending our stackable filesystem, NeXUS, to enable fine-grained sharing of protected
volumes without requiring any server-side changes. Our prototype imposes minimal key
management on users, supports a declarative policy language, mandatory access logging, and
ensures both forward and backward secrecy. Using microbenchmarks and example cases,
we demonstrate that our prototype can enforce a wide range of user policies, and provides
scalable policy management for up to 25,000 policies over Dropbox.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Today, mainstream file sharing services boast hundreds of millions of daily users, and store
billions of gigabytes in files [2]. Built on top of low-cost and globally available cloud storage,
these services provide a convenient interface to store, share, and synchronize files online.
However, the sale and unauthorized sharing of private data by service providers, as well as
frequent data breaches and unplanned disclosures on the cloud, have raised user privacy
concerns [9, 10, 11]. As individuals and organizations store larger amounts of personal and
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private information on these platforms, it is evermore critical to provide a data security
solution that does not rely on the service provider.
Beyond providing data confidentiality and integrity, users may also wish to selectively
share information with other users within or across organizations. Furthermore, users typically
share information under a given context or towards a particular purpose. Thus, addressing
these security and privacy concerns requires: (i) access control [121, 74] to determine the
conditions for user authorization, and (ii) usage control [122, 82, 84] to restrict how data may
be handled post authorization. Usage control extends traditional notions of data access control
with continuous enforcement, and obligations such as: “delete this file in 15 days”. However,
developing a robust enforcement mechanism for the cloud poses several challenges: (i) a large
number of users accessing an unbounded number of resources with varying granularity; (ii)
dynamic access changes as users and files are continuously added, removed and updated; and
(iii) information sharing across administrative domains such that user identity is not known
in advance.
This chapter explores the subtleties of distributed policy enforcement by focusing on
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), a flexible and dynamic access control model that
can be extended to also support usage control (UCON) [74, 123, 84]. ABAC generalizes
previous identity-based schemes, and evaluates access requests using attributes that are
assigned to users, objects, and the environment. For example, an educational institution may
have “Professors can access Faculty directories”, as a policy to restrict access to department
files. Attributes simplify policy management, especially when user or object entities are
not known a priori (e.g., multi-domain scenarios), and contextual information (e.g., time,
location) is required for multi-factor access evaluation. This also reduces the administrative
burden, as users and objects can be continuously provisioned without requiring any updates
to existing policies.
We propose a practical security solution that: (i) allows for user deployment without
requiring any server-side coordination or reliance on trusted intermediaries, (ii) supports
user sharing with fine-grained and dynamic access control policies, and (iii) incurs modest
performance overheads on typical user workloads. In addition, our solution must provide
a foundation for rich sharing semantics such as multi-authority attributes, delegation, and
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usage control. Our goal is to protect the confidentiality and integrity of a user’s data against
all untrusted parties, including unauthorized users, external attackers, and even the service
provider.
Existing approaches to secure access and usage control, however, fall short of satisfying
these requirements. Much work on usage control has focused on obligation languages, formal
specifications, and reference architectures, but often make simplified assumptions about the
client-server architecture [86, 87, 88]. Several cryptographic schemes such as Attribute-Based
Encryption (ABE) have been proposed to achieve fine-grained access control, while protecting
sensitive data from untrusted parties [124, 125, 126]. However, pure cryptographic solutions
exhibit significant overheads on user revocation, and oftentimes rely on server-side support
for dynamic access changes. Alternatively, Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) such
as Intel SGX or ARM Trustzone can be used to enable strong security primitives within an
untrusted environment. However, existing approaches either restrict themselves to centralized
administration on a single machine or require server-side support for trusted hardware, which
in effect hinders adoption by users of cloud-based services [32, 111, 34].
We present Joplin, a privacy-preserving ABAC enforcement system that guarantees
confidentiality and integrity over unmodified third-party storage platforms. Joplin enables
users to manage attributes and specify declarative access policies separately from the un-
derlying storage. By adopting a declarative syntax, policies can unambiguously express the
conditions under which a user has authorized access, without requiring a priori knowledge
of particular user/object entities nor details about the enforcement mechanism. To accom-
plish this, Joplin leverages a client-side SGX enclave that stores access control information
within cryptographically-protected metadata for enforcement at decryption time. Because
the enclave performs cryptographic operations without leaking the encryption key, updating
attributes and policies only requires re-encrypting relatively small metadata objects. This
leads to efficient revocation even in large-scale dynamic environments.
Joplin is based on the NeXUS stackable filesystem, is completely client-side, and does
not require any server-side changes or trusted intermediaries. Policy enforcement exclusively
occurs on each client machine, which collectively realize user-centric and decentralized access
control. Further, placing our reference monitor at the client provides direct access to the
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client’s environment when enforcing usage policies. To demonstrate the practicality of Joplin,
we extended NeXUS, a stackable filesystem that allows mutually trusting users to securely
share files on top of unmodified storage. Joplin’s modular architecture is split into (i) an
enclave that applies cryptographic protections and hosts a virtual filesystem alongside a
Joplin Controller, and (ii) an untrusted portion that maps filesystem and ABAC operations
from the enclave unto the underlying storage platform. This approach enables independent
policy enforcement, while transparently supporting a wide range of storage services such as
remote filesystems and object-based storage platforms.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a client-side architecture for enforcing fine-grained ABAC and usage control
over remote untrusted storage. Joplin provides a unified interface to manage attributes
and policies, while ensuring data confidentiality and integrity by performing cryptographic
operations and access control enforcement inside the enclave without leaking sensitive key
material. With Joplin, policy management on existing storage platforms is independent of
the service provider or any trusted intermediary.
• We develop a prototype that addresses the practical challenges of decentralized policy
management on the cloud without requiring any server-side modifications or additional
infrastructure. This includes attribute sharing across domains, user delegation, and
mandatory access logging. Additionally, Joplin provides efficient revocation with forward
and backward secrecy, while maintaining complete ownership throughout the data lifecycle.
• We evaluate our prototype using several case studies and filesystem workloads. Results show
that our implementation enforces declarative policies efficiently, operates over unmodified
Dropbox, and has policy maintenance overheads that scale with the number of users and
policies. Joplin allows both individuals and organizations to manage and protect their data
without significant degradation on typical user workloads.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 covers background and related work on
access and usage control. In Section 5.3, we describe the high-level design of our ABAC
system, and Section 5.4 realizes a prototype from this design. In Section 5.5, we evaluate the
expressiveness and performance of our prototype. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.
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5.2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
This section presents a brief description of ABAC, usage control, decentralized policy man-
agement, and trusted hardware.
5.2.1 Attribute-Based Access Control
In ABAC [74, 123], policies are expressed as boolean combinations of attributes, and access
decisions are determined by evaluating policies against user attributes, object attributes,
and relevant environment conditions. Attributes denote traits that either statically assigned
by an administrator (e.g., user role) or dynamically set by the runtime (e.g., file path).
This simplifies policy management as attributes can arbitrarily group entities with flexible
granularity, without requiring the apriori identification of individual users or objects. Dynamic
access control is provided by simply updating attribute values, which may change the access
decision between requests. This has allowed ABAC to supplant prior identity-based access
models, including DAC, MAC, and even RBAC [75].
The related work on ABAC can be broadly grouped into: (i) Formal models that
define the basic ABAC elements (i.e., users, objects, attributes etc.) along with their
relations and constraints [75]; (ii) Policy Languages to express authorization rules [77]; and
(iii) Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) for fine-grained cryptographic access control using
a many-to-one public encryption scheme [125, 126]. In ABE, an administrator generates
keys in a tree-like structure and assigns them to users, such that decryption is only possible
if the user has the necessary attributes (KP-ABE) or satisfies the ciphertext access policy
(CP-ABE).
Although ABAC offers a promising solution for protecting cloud applications, practical
instantiations either consider static scenarios, or oftentimes rely on a semi-trusted server
for dynamic access control [124, 125, 126]. Whereas extensive research has focused on data
security with ABE, implementations offer limited expressiveness in supporting environment
attributes, and incur severe computational overheads on user revocation. By requiring bulk
file re-encryption and key redistribution, the revocation cost is proportional to the number of
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affected user files and their degree of sharing. Given that we target a dynamic environment
where access policies and user memberships may change frequently and unpredictably, we
address these shortcomings without any server-side coordination, while providing efficient
user revocation, as well as fine-grained and context-aware access control.
5.2.2 Usage Control
Usage control (UCON) is a generalization of access control that considers not only who can
access data, but also how this data may be used or distributed in the future [82, 83, 84]. UCON
is an attribute-based model centered on two aspects: mutable attributes and continuous
enforcement. Mutability recognizes that user, objects, or environment attributes may change
while access is in progress. Continuous enforcement ensures that policies are evaluated before,
during, and after the usage period, and may terminate usage in the event of a violation.
Besides attribute-based authorization, a UCON policy also includes obligations and conditions.
Obligations are actions or requirements (e.g., “delete file after 20 reads”) that must be fulfilled
throughout the usage, whereas conditions are environment restrictions (e.g., time) validated
before and during usage. UCON can encompass traditional access control models, trust
management, and even DRM [82].
Prior research on usage control has mostly focused on obligations and reference enforcement
architectures [86, 87, 90]. Distributed usage control is the ability of a data owner to restrict
remote remote usage by requiring enforcement on every machine that stores, processes, and
distributes sensitive data [91]. Depending on the application, enforcement may occur either
on the server, the client, or a combination of both. Whichever the case, the monitoring on
the client must be tamper-proof, impossible to circumvent, and verifiable in enforcing access
and usage policies. However, in addition to privacy issues, centralized scenarios also incur
significant client–server communication overhead, and require the server to be always online.
Other works make trustworthiness assumptions of client-side components to ensure data
confidentiality and integrity [86]. Hardware-based approaches have been proposed, but they
either rely on expensive hardware or do not provide isolated execution [92]. We address these
data security issues by leveraging commodity trusted hardware to provide scalable access
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and usage control within a distributed file sharing environment.
5.2.3 Decentralized Policy Management
In large scale systems with many users and files, requiring centralized administration for every
access right may be unbearable and even obstruct user collaboration. Due to the flexible
and dynamic nature of ABAC, we identify two important features that could serve as key
enablers for upcoming generations of decentralized access control systems: multi-domain
policies and delegation.
Multi-domain policies. Typically, administrators in ABAC define the set of attributes
within a given domain. Attributes can only be assigned to users/objects within that domain,
and presumably, system policies are only expressible in terms of those attributes. However,
there exist situations where policy specification could include attributes from other domains.
For instance, consider a group of researchers who want to share resources, but their respective
organizations have no common trusted root authority. Each organization maintains complete
control their attribute definition and policy specification, but want to selectively share a
subset of their resources, while ensuring safety from inappropriate access. Trust Management
and Trust Negotiation are techniques for establishing trust within an open environment
using attributes [127, 128]. We offer similar attribute-based access control with multi-domain
support using commodity trusted hardware and distributed reference monitors, as opposed
to prior implementations that require special infrastructure to distribute credentials.
Delegation. This is the ability of a delegator to selectively their transfer rights unto a
delegatee [129]. The delegatee is granted temporary access on behalf of the delegator, who
can revoke the transferred privileges at anytime. For example, a professor could delegate
“maintainer” privileges for their teaching assistant to manage a submission directory, before
revoking them at the end of the semester. However, user delegation within a distributed
environment poses several challenges, including timely revocation and using fresh attributes at
evaluation time. In addressing these issues, secure delegation offers a flexible mechanism for
discretionary access control between trusting parties, without leakage of private credentials.
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5.2.4 Hardware-Assisted Access Control
Several works have proposed using TEEs to enable secure access control. IBBE-SGX [32] pro-
poses a computationally efficient IBBE scheme and A-SKY [111] addresses the impracticality
of anonymous broadcast encryption. However, both restrict all group membership operations
to an administrator that hosts the enclave. PESOS allows users to specify per-object access
policies, which are enforced by policy-based engine within the enclave [34]. Like Joplin, the
policies are written using a declarative syntax. However, it requires server-side support for
trusted hardware as well as specialized Kinetic storage drives, which at the time of writing
are not readily available on cloud services. In this paper, our approach requires no server-side
modifications, while providing a decentralized enforcement and rich user sharing.
5.3 SYSTEM DESIGN
We now present Joplin, a secure access and usage control enforcement system for untrusted
storage platforms. After outlining our design goals, we describe the client-side approach,
ABAC model, policy language, obligations support, and high-level architecture. Altogether,
this provides a solid foundation for developing fine-grained and scalable attribute-based user
sharing within existing cloud-based environments.
5.3.1 Design goals
Similar to NeXUS, our design provides a balance between practicality and portability with
the following requirements:
• Practicality: The number of keys managed by users should not increase with group
membership or permitted objects.
• Portability: The system must not require any server-side modifications or trusted inter-
mediaries, and should be compatible with commodity cloud storage platforms. We rely on
the underlying filesystem interface for metadata storage and distribution.
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• Scalability: Access control enforcement must scale up to thousands of users and policies.
Likewise, revoking users and updating access control information should be efficient without
inducing a cascade of metadata updates.
• Rich semantics. Beyond providing fine-grained access and usage control, the system must
provide a secure foundation for decentralized policy enforcement, including user delegation,
usage control, and cross-domain attribute sharing.
We opt for a small TCB and minimal interface so that library applications and secure
filesystems (e.g., NeXUS [107]) can easily incorporate our solution for secure ABAC enforce-
ment. Furthermore, the distribution of generated metadata should not require the deployment
of additional services; instead our solution should allow users to employ their existing storage
platform. Hence, we minimize storage assumptions and adopt a lightweight solution that
stores metadata as files, such that integration with various storage systems is possible with
moderate effort.
5.3.2 Client-side Approach
Reference monitors are the standard mechanism for continuous enforcement of access and
usage control policies in traditional systems [130]. As part of the TCB, a reference monitor
observes all accesses to sensitive objects, evaluates requests against security policies, and
undertakes corrective action in the event of a violation. A straightforward solution would
be to develop a server-side monitor that mediates all user requests against a centralized
repository. This could provide fast and granular data access and provide a global scope
for enforcing policies. Because our threat model considers the server as untrusted, one
could employ trusted hardware to prevent malicious providers from subverting the monitor’s
operation. However, this requires trusted hardware support on the server, which at the
time of writing still is not widely available amongst cloud providers. Alternatively, we can
treat the cloud as an opaque storage layer with a client-side approach that intercepts and
enforces access requests at the consumer end. To prevent unauthorized users from accessing
or tampering sensitive information, this approach requires data distribution in encrypted
form. Although purely cryptographic techniques like ABE provide data security, they do not
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readily support environment attributes, which are necessary for multi-factor authorization
and obligations enforcement.
In this work, our approach is to execute the reference monitor on individual client
machines and utilize TEE primitives (Section 5.2.4) for decentralized access control. Isolated
execution enables tamper-proof access enforcement and cryptographic protections, whereas
Sealed storage and Remote attestation allow the persistence of cryptographic material across
valid trusted hardware platforms. We ensure confidentiality and integrity by storing user-
provided access policies within encrypted metadata files, and enable seamless key distribution
by securely attaching key material that is only accessible inside the enclave. As a result,
cryptographic material remains under the control of the enclave, which in turn independently
enforces access and usage control. Given the widespread availability of trusted hardware on
commodity machines, our user-centric solution can be easily deployed by individuals and
organizations of existing remote storage services, without relying on a centralized server or
additional infrastructure.
Although trusted hardware may alleviate the computational and network overheads
associated with pure cryptographic schemes, building a practical access control system
presents several challenges. Because continuous enforcement relies on multiple components,
performance depends on their complexity and degree of inter-communication. Therefore,
beyond providing an access control model and a policy language, the enforcement architecture
must also support efficient user revocation, manageable administrative costs, as well as
interoperability across domains.
5.3.3 ABAC Model
This work focuses on ABAC, a flexible and dynamic model which uses attributes to separate
privilege assignment from policy specification; user, object, and environment attributes can
be provisioned and managed in a decentralized fashion, whereas policies arbitrarily combine
attributes in a fine-grained manner. This makes ABAC particularly well-suited for providing
access and usage control within an open environment. We build on ABACα, a foundational
model with minimal assumptions on administrative control or system attributes [75]. Formally,
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Command Meaning
add_user/remove_user Add or remove user
add_object/remove_object Add or remove object
add_attribute/remove_attribute Add or remove user/object attribute
grant_attribute/revoke_attribute Grant or revoke user/object attribute
add_policy/remove_policy Add or remove policy rule
Table 5: Joplin Administrative ABAC commands
our ABAC model is described by the tuple 〈U, O, UA, OA, UAA, OAA, PERM, Po, Auth〉
as follows:
• The set U contains identities for all users in the system, whereas O refers to all the protected
objects.
• User attributes (UA) and object attributes (OA) are the sets of all attributes that can be
assigned to users and objects, respectively. The relations UAA (U × UA) and OAA
(O × OA) are user-assigned and object-assigned attributes, respectively. Assigned attributes
have an optional integer or string value.
• Permissions (PERM) are possible system actions or privileges, which include read, write,
create, delete, and audit. At runtime, the audit permission is enforced as an obligation
that records the current access request unto a log file.
• Policies (Po) are the set of policy rules representing the conditions under which an access
is authorized. The syntax is described by our policy language in Section 5.3.4, whereby
each rule maps a given permission to combination of user and object attributes.
• The authorization function (Auth) that takes a request (perm, u, o) and the current access
state 〈UAA, OAA, Po〉 as inputs, and returns true if the user/object attributes satisfy a
system policy with the matching permission.
Administrative model. With regards to our system model, the volume owner is in
charge of administering access control information within a given domain, but is not required




@uname(U, x) Check user name
@upubkey(U, x) Check user public key
@oname(O, x) Check object name
@opath(O, x) Check object full path
@oversion(O, x) Check object version








x and y are constants (i.e., a string or number)
Table 6: Predicates in Joplin’s predicate language
management, user membership, and policy specification. Each command takes the current
system state 〈U, O, UA, OA, UAA, OAA, Po〉 with arguments, and transition unto a new
state 〈U′, O′, UA′, OA′, UAA′, OAA′, Po′〉. In our implementation, we extend this model to
provide flexible administrative and sharing paradigms.
5.3.4 Policy Language
Joplin provides a declarative policy language for protecting confidentiality and integrity
with an ABAC environment. The language is based on Datalog, a logic-based programming
language with a simple syntax, concise semantics, and efficient computation over large
datasets [131]. A Datalog program consists of facts that assert relevant traits, rules that
deduce facts from other facts, and queries that verify the existence of facts. Rules are
expressed as Horn clauses with the form ‘L0 :- L1, ..., Ln’, where L0 is the head and each Li
is a literal with the shape ‘predicate(term,...)’. Adopting a declarative approach not only
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provides fine-grained and context-aware expressiveness, but also ensures that policies have
a precise meaning that is independent of the enforcement mechanism or the identities of
existing user or object entities [34].
Essentially, Joplin policy rules are authorization functions that grant specific permissions
by evaluating user (U) and object (O) attributes with predicates. For example, to authorize
“read if the user is a student and the object is the CS449 book”:
read :- isStudent(U), book(O, “CS449”)
Our policy language also supports predicates that encode dynamic elements of a system.
Shown in Table 6, Joplin provides 3 types of predicates: (i) static predicates that capture
assigned attributes; (ii) dynamic predicates that capture runtime information; and (iii)
boolean predicates that can compare attribute values. Predicates take two terms, but static
predicates can omit the second argument to check for attribute existence. Both static and
dynamic predicates are tied to user or object entities, but the latter checks for information
that is not explicitly set by the owner (e.g., user location, object version). For example,
“write if the user’s role attribute is faculty and file name is foo.md” translates to:
write :- role(U, “faculty”), @oname(O, “foo.md”)
Another example, “write if the user is a student and object’s version is below 30” becomes:
write :- isStudent(U), @oversion(O, X), _lt(X, 30)
Lastly, our language also allows policies to capture attributes that belong to other
domains. These are similar to static predicates, but their identifier is prefixed with the
domain’s namespace. Assuming a user wishes to capture attributes from a domain named
‘mint’ and restrict read access to ‘mint’ employees:
read :- _mint_employee(U), @oname(O, “secret_docs”)
At runtime, user and object attributes are copied as facts into the Datalog reasoner,

























Figure 18: Taxonomy of Obligations from prior work focusing on Applicability and Imple-
mentation [132]. Black circles can be readily supported by Joplin.
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5.3.5 Support for Obligations
Obligations are mandatory actions or requirements that have to be satisfied as part of
an object’s usage [82, 133, 134]. Depending on the specific scenario, distinct obligations
policies can dictate how data may be used or distributed beyond authorization. However,
our client-side architecture and use of trusted hardware restricts the scope of enforceable
obligations. For example, SGX does not allow direct access to system facilities such as time,
system calls, or library functions. Therefore, we survey how obligations enforcement has been
employed in prior work, and explore how different aspects apply to our design [132, 135, 85].
Shown in Figure 18, we focus on Applicability and Implementation, leaving out criteria such
as License and other non-functional properties (e.g., cost).
Applicability deals with what is expressible within a policy, including the usage class and
conditions. There are two usage classes: black box usage where data is simply managed and
distributed as bytes, and white box usage that involves further data processing, rendering, or
execution. Conditions define the environmental context: (i) Time denotes when to fulfill the
obligation; (ii) Cardinality is to how many times an action occurs; (iii) Events result from
specific system operations; (iv) Environment refers to organizational, technical, and physical
requirements; and (v) Purpose are human-specified rules. Conditions are evaluated before
and during usage, and can be combined to form expressive policies; e.g., “delete file by 20
days or after 20 reads” uses both time and cardinality.
On the other hand, Implementation is concerned with the types of enforcement, distribu-
tion model, and logging capabilities. Enforcement types include: (i) inhibiting the attempted
usage, (ii) introducing a finite delay (e.g., waiting for a server response), (iii) modifying usage
data (e.g., down-sampling images on mobile), or (iv) executing actions (e.g., deleting an
attribute). Lastly, the distribution model is whether the usage can be enforced recurrently or
just once, whereas logging is the ability to securely record system operations.
As described in the literature, obligations enforcement can be expressed in terms of
controllability or observability [133]. Controllable obligations are executed either as part
of internal system actions (e.g., deleting a file), or require communication with an external
component that guarantees fulfillment. As such, our architecture supports black box usage
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fully, while providing partial support for white box usage via in-enclave processing (e.g., image
compression). For conditions: (i) time can be incorporated by validating the responses from
a trusted time service with a public key pinned inside the enclave [28, 136], (ii) cardinality
such “homework file can only be read twice” could be enforced by counting the number of
read entries in a log file, and (iii) events could be detected from internal system operations.
For different enforcement types: inhibition, finite delay, modifications, and execution of
actions can be supported if performed within the enclave, although finite delay will require a
fine-grained time source [136].
Observable obligations provide a weaker notion in that fulfillment is only verifiable because
they either require human intervention, or interact with an external component that does
not provide strong enforcement guarantees. For example, although we could readily support
the detection of platform specifications (e.g., CPUID), integrating physical aspects such as
location or external technologies (e.g., firewall presence) requires trustworthiness assumptions.
This also applies to white-box usages such as rendering to a screen and executing another
program. Purpose restrictions (e.g., for private use only) and license agreements cannot be
readily enforced by our system.
Non-observable obligations are neither executable nor verifiable. This usually involves
obligations whose enforcement occurs in the future (e.g., notify the user in 2 days). However,
non-observable obligations can be made observable through logging capabilities that could
later be examined to discover any potential violations [133]. To this purpose, we implemented
an audit mechanism that leverages the enclave runtime to record access authorizations inside
an encrypted log file (Section 5.4.3).
5.3.6 High-Level Architecture
The central component of Joplin is a Controller that runs inside an enclave. Joplin unifies
policy enforcement and data security by mapping user/object identities to attributes, while
internally managing access control information within metadata. To provide confidentiality
and integrity, the enclave encrypts metadata using enclave-resident keys, before sending the

































Figure 19: Joplin High-Level Design
enclave, which utilizes trusted hardware protections to independently enforce the embedded
access and usage control policies.
Depicted in Figure 19, Joplin exposes an interface for administering access control and
providing continuous enforcement. To accomplish this, Joplin coordinates the following
subcomponents: (i) an Attribute manager that handles user, object, and environment
attributes; (ii) a Policy manager that manages access and usage control policies; (iii) an
Access broker that determines user authorization; (iv) an Obligations module that performs
usage requirements; (v) a logic engine that evaluates access requests using system policies
and relevant attributes. The Attribute and Policy managers collectively serve as the Policy
Information Point (PIP), whereas the Access broker and Obligations module refer to the
Policy Decision Point (PDP). The PIP provides an interface for retrieving, subscribing, and
updating attributes, as well as policies. This includes user attributes from other domains and
delegated attributes from other users. The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) mainly intercepts
and forwards access requests from the user, and enforces the PDP’s authorization/obligation
decision.
On every access request, the Controller first invokes the PIP to fetch the necessary
attributes and policies. This involves interacting with the Storage API to fetch the necessary
metadata, which are then decrypted and verified inside the enclave before use. After updating
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the internal access control state (i.e., attributes, policies, and partial results), the Controller
invokes the PDP to evaluate the request. The Access broker communicates with the logic
engine to determine if the user has the requested permission over a given object. Likewise,
the obligations module evaluates usage policies and performs obligation actions, which may
include updating attributes via the PIP or aborting the request. Finally, after re-encrypting
and committing every updated metadata object to the storage API, the Controller returns
the PDP decision to the PEP for enforcement. Thus, by managing access control information
inside encrypted metadata, Joplin essentially acts like a transparent security layer over
unmodified storage.
5.4 IMPLEMENTATION
We now describe the implementation of a Joplin prototype that enforces fine-grained access
and usage control within a secure filesystem environment. We extend NeXUS filesystem
interface with an access broker that uses attributes and policies to evaluate authorization
requests. While taking into account the architectural limitations of trusted hardware, Joplin
provides, efficient revocation, and decentralized policy administration with multi-domain
support and user delegation.
5.4.1 Metadata
ABAC enforcement within a filesystem requires storing user attributes for each volume user,
object attributes for each file and directory, as well as policy rules for the volume. In addition,
access control data must be confidential, integrity-protected, and consistent with filesystem
information. Depicted in Figure 20, Joplin manages a flat namespace comprising of three
metadata types: attribute space, policy store, and assignment table.
• Attribute space: Defines the set of all user and object attributes in a volume. It contains
a list of (name, type, UUID) triplets called schemas, where type is either user or object.





















Figure 20: Joplin Metadata Structures.
each attribute is assigned a randomly generated UUID at creation time. The attribute space
also tracks the last known metadata version of the policy store.
• Policy store: Lists all the policy rules in the volume. Each policy rule maps a permission
to an encoded string representation. Rules can be added and removed by the volume owner.
The policy store also stores the last known version of the attribute space.
• Assignment table: Contains the list of assigned attributes for a particular user or
object (file/directory). Each entry consists of an (attribute_uuid, value) tuple, where
attribute_uuid points to the schema inside the attribute space. The volume owner can
grant, revoke, and update assigned attributes at any time. In a similar fashion, the
assignment table tracks the last known versions of the attribute space and the policy store
metadata.
The attribute space contains the set of user and object attributes (UA ∪ OA), the
policy store contains the set of all policies (Po), and the assignment table handles individual
user-assigned (∈ UAA) and object-assigned (∈ OAA) attributes. We integrate access control
information with the NeXUS VFS by: (i) extending the supernode with the UUIDs of the
attribute space and policy store to load them at system startup, (ii) inlining assignment
tables within individual filenodes and dirnodes to store object-assigned attributes, and (iii)
creating an assignment table for every user entry in the supernode to store user-assigned
attributes. This ensures that file/directory access control information is provided alongside
with filesystem information during access requests, and that attribute/policy changes require
only a fixed number of metadata updates. For example, attribute revocation only requires
82
deleting the entry from the corresponding user or object assignment table. Likewise, removing
a user from the volume consists in deleting their entry inside the supernode, along with their
user assignment table metadata.
5.4.2 System Initialization
In a typical workflow, a user first mounts their volume on a local directory and begins
accessing its contents. However, the enclave must first authenticate and load the user’s
credentials. This includes directly assigned attributes within the local volume, attributes
from other domains, as well as delegated attributes. Assuming that the volume rootkey has
already been exchanged amongst the parties (Section 4.3.4.1), we now describe how Alice
mounts a volume owned by Owen.
User authentication. The supernode stores the identities of the volume owner and
other authorized users as (name, public key, UUID) entries. For user authentication, the
enclave: (i) decrypts/verifies the supernode metadata to ensure it has not been tampered
with, (ii) confirms Alice has been granted to the volume by checking her public key inside
the supernode, and (iii) establishes that Alice owns the matching private key through a
signature verification on a nonce [107]. On success, the enclave uses the metadata UUIDs
inside the supernode to fetch the attribute space, policy store, and Alice’s user assignment
table. After each metadata is decrypted and verified, the Attribute and Policy managers load
the attributes and system policies inside enclave memory.
Cross-volume attributes. To support user attributes from multiple domains, we
provide an interface to attach and detach volumes at runtime. We extended the supernode
with a list of foreign volumes, such that each (supernode_uuid, namespace) tuple maps
a foreign volume unto a unique namespace. Let us assume Owen adds the MintCorp
volume with “mint” as the namespace, and Alice is a MintCorp user that wishes to load her
foreign attributes. Similar to user authentication, attaching the foreign volume involves: (i)
decrypting and verifying the MintCorp supernode, (ii) validating the MintCorp supernode
UUID is a foreign volume within Owen’s supernode, and (iii) confirming the presence of Alice’s
public key in the MintCorp supernode. To complete the process, the MintCorp attribute
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space and Alice’s foreign user assignment table are loaded into the enclave. The Attribute
Manager maintains a map of volume namespace and the corresponding user attributes.
Delegated attributes. We provide an interface for delegators to select attributes from
their user assignment table, and transfer them unto a delegatee. This enabled by a delegate
file, a metadata object that contains the public keys of the delegator and delegatee, as well
as the UUIDs of the delegated attributes. To track the delegate files issued by each user,
we also extended the user assignment table with a list of delegate file UUIDs. Assume that
another user, Carey has delegated the “maintainer” attribute to Alice. Specifically, Alice
is in possession of a delegate file, and Carey’s user assignment table contains the delegate
file UUID. With this, the enclave loads Alice’s delegated attributes by: (i) decrypting and
verifying the delegate file metadata, (ii) fetching Carey’s assignment table, and (iii) checking
the presence of the delegate file inside Carey’s assignment table. To complete the process,
the Attribute Manager adds the delegated attributes and Carey’s assignment table to a list.
With initialization complete, the logic engine can begin pre-computing intermediary
results using the loaded system policies and user attributes. This pre-caching of results
enables efficient query evaluation at access time. However, although user attributes are
expected to change rarely, dynamic enforcement requires refreshing the enclave state to
ensure correct access and usage decisions at evaluation time. Therefore, we measure the
query evaluation latency and the refreshing cost in our evaluation.
5.4.3 Enforcing Access Policies
Once mounted, users can employ their applications to issue filesystem requests within the
volume. To ensure that only authorized users can access particular files and directories, this
section describes how the Joplin Controller orchestrates metadata and various components
on every filesystem request. The core functionality enabling continuous enforcement is a logic
engine that reasons over a knowledge base inside trusted memory.
The knowledge base represents an abstract datalog program, containing a subset of the
access control state with up-to-date facts and rules. Each fact is a 〈UUID, predicate, value〉
triple, which asserts that a user/object entity has a given predicate and an associated
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optional value. Facts are of two types: assigned facts that are extracted from the user/object
assignment table, and contextual facts that are derived from system runtime information (e.g.,
file size, user name). More specifically, assigned facts comport local, foreign, and delegated
attributes. On the other hand, rules are extracted from the volume’s policy store. To detect
stale facts and rules, the knowledge base also tracks the metadata version for each cached
user/object entity, as well as the policy store.
5.4.3.1 Preprocessing From the previous subsection, consider Alice, who after mounting
Owen’s volume, has attached the MintCorp volume and loaded the delegate file from Carey.
Assume that Alice now requests to read the ‘bar/cake.c’ file. This is intercepted by the
NeXUS VFS, which traverses the path to retrieve the filenode metadata. The Joplin
Controller is then invoked with the read permission and the filenode containing the object
assignment table.
• First, the Attribute and Policy managers retrieve metadata to refresh Alice’s attributes
and polices, including the metadata of every mounted and attached attribute space, Alice’s
local and foreign assignment table, Carey’s assignment table (for the delegated attributes),
and the policy store. For each metadata, we check the knowledge base for staleness and
retract the corresponding facts/rules if the metadata is considered newer.
• We use the Attribute Manager to generate assigned facts from the user and object assignment
tables. For each 〈attribute_uuid, value〉 entry of the assignment table, the attribute_uuid
is used to lookup its corresponding name inside the attribute space (see Figure 20). The
attribute name is then conjoined with the user/object metadata UUID and attribute_value
to form an assigned fact. For example, Alice’s attribute table may return 〈role, student〉,
〈city, pittsburgh〉 as assigned facts. The process is repeated for the foreign and delegated
user attributes as follows:
– For each foreign assignment table, we prefix each attribute name with the names-
pace of the corresponding volume. For example, if Alice has 〈role, employee〉 at-
tribute assignment in the Mint Corp volume, the corresponding assigned fact will be
〈_mint_role, employee〉. By prefixing attributes with their respective namespace, the
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logic engine can differentiate between attribute domains without requiring any changes
to the existing reasoning algorithm.
– For each delegate file, (i) we check its UUID is still present in the delegator’s assignment
table, and (ii) use its delegated attribute UUIDs as a mask over the delegator’s assignment
table. This ensures that the delegate file has not been revoked, and the reasoning
process uses up-to-date attributes.
• For contextual facts, we enumerate the metadata using a fixed set of runtime functions (see
dynamic predicates in Table 6). Examples of Alice’s contextual facts are 〈@uname, alice〉
and 〈@upubkey, ab29e8〉, as her name and public key, respectively.
• Finally, we use the Policy manager to load the policy rules into the knowledge base.
5.4.3.2 Evaluation This stage serves as the central point for policy evaluation (i.e.,
authorization and obligations), before returning execution to the NeXUS VFS, which then
enforces the evaluation result. For authorization, the access broker queries the logic engine
with the permission, user, and object. The Datalog engine reasons over the knowledge base
to generate inferences that match the query. Meanwhile, the Obligations module monitors
system events, evaluates the usage policies, and performs the required actions.
We implemented an obligations mechanism that records the read and write operations
on a given file or directory. After authorization is granted, the logic engine is queried with
the ‘audit’ permission to determine whether the current operation has to be recorded. As an
example, to record filesystem operations on ‘bar/cake.c’:
audit :- @opath(O, “bar/cake.c”)
To accomplish this, every object (i.e., filenode and dirnode metadata) is associated with a
log whose entries contain: the operation (read or write), the user’s identity, and the object’s
version. The log is maintained as a metadata object, and is thus cryptographically-protected
by the enclave runtime. Upon successful evaluation of the audit policy, an entry is simply
appended to the log before proceeding with the operation. This lightweight approach only
indicates that the access request was permitted, and does not imply the operation was
successful (e.g., the application may crash).
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5.4.4 Implementation Details
We developed a userspace program that uses SGX for transparent and secure access to
protected volumes residing on remote untrusted storage. Per our design goals, our prototype
does not require any server-side changes. Using the SGX SDK, we split our application into
an untrusted portion that runs in normal userspace and a trusted portion that runs inside
the enclave. The untrusted portion (14.2K SLOC) mainly (i) implements the filesystem
and ABAC interfaces, and (ii) provides metadata access via the storage API. Whereas, the
trusted portion encloses sensitive operations, including cryptographic protection and policy
enforcement.
The enclave design is small and minimalistic. With a total binary size of 1.8MB, the
enclave easily fits within the limited enclave-reserved memory (SGX provides about 96MB),
while leaving ample memory for runtime allocations. Excluding external libraries, our TCB
primarily comprised of the Joplin Controller (5K SLOC) and the NeXUS VFS (15K SLOC).
For cryptographic support, we included a subset of the MbedTLS library and a C-based
implementation of GCM-SIV key-wrapping primitive. Our logic engine comprised of a small
datalog reasoner (1K SLOC) written in Lua, a lightweight embeddable scripting language
with a small virtual machine (<20K SLOC) [137, 138]. The enclave interface comprised of
44 ecalls and 10 ocalls. Ecalls marshal data from the filesystem and ABAC interfaces into
the enclave, whereas ocalls facilitate enclave access to data/metadata objects. To prevent
inadvertent leakage, we sanity check our inputs and explicitly copy untrusted buffers into
trusted memory before passing it to sensitive enclave code.
5.4.4.1 Cache management Joplin employs several caches in order to improve the
efficiency of various ABAC operations, including in-enclave caches for recently accessed
metadata and the knowledge base, and untrusted memory buffers storing encrypted metadata.
On every request, the enclave checks for metadata freshness via the storage API and updates
the caches on change. The Lua reasoner represents the knowledge base as a Lua hash table,
and also provides an interface for asserting/revoking facts and rules. To prevent the enclave
from running out of memory, the user can set a maximum for the number facts and policies
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in the knowledge base.
5.5 EVALUATION
5.5.1 Use cases
In this section, we evaluate the expressiveness of the Joplin policy language by demonstrating
its applicability across several use cases.
5.5.1.1 Case study 1 For a semester’s course, a professor creates a volume to store
student homework submissions within a flat directory. There are two user types: students
and a Teaching Assistant (TA).
• The professor creates the isStudent and isTA user attributes, and assigns them to students
and the TA, respectively.
• Students can submit a single file, but can overwrite up to 5 times.
• Students can read their own submission.
• The TA can read all submissions.
create :- isStudent(U)
write :- @oversion(O, X), _lt(X, 5), @ocreator(O, U)
read :- isStudent(U), @ocreator(O, U)
read :- isTA(U)
In this use case, the data producers are the invited users and the administrator just
formulates rules to control who can read/write. Note that the enclave automatically increments
every object’s version during metadata encryption. Although the policies do not prevent the
students from creating multiple submissions (creating a file with a different name), the TA
could use the oldest created file and ignore the extras.
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5.5.1.2 Case study 2 Jessie wants to share her pictures with her friend Mallory, and
two groups of people: friends and family. This scenario is one in which a data producer
intends to share files with data consumers, who can only access a portion of the data.
• Jessie creates two user attributes: isFriend and isFamily, and 3 object attributes: isFavorite,
isVacation, and isSensitive.
• Friends can access favorite pictures.
• Family can access vacation pictures.
• Mallory can access sensitive pictures.
read :- isFriend(U), isFavorite(O)
read :- isFamily(U), isVacation(O)
read :- @uname(U, “mallory”), isSensitive(O)
5.5.2 Performance
To demonstrate that Joplin can provide scalable access control, we evaluated our prototype
through a series of microbenchmarks and end-to-end tests. Based on the design goals in
Section 5.3.1, we measure the enforcement and administrative overheads to answer the
following:
1. Can the system support a large set of users and policies?
2. Can policies be added/removed efficiently?
3. What are the overheads on standard user workloads?
We performed our experiments on an i7 @3.4GHz with 8GB RAM and 128MB of EPC
memory, running SGX SDK 2.2 and Ubuntu 18.04 LTS. The tests consist in measuring the
latency of various access control and filesystem operations within Joplin. For timing enclave
operations, we use an untrusted script that updates a memory location with a time value,
which is then copied into the enclave. We stored the volume in a Dropbox shared folder, such
that all changes are asynchronously uploaded by the daemon unto the cloud. To measure I/O
latency, we used a python script that pauses execution until the Dropbox daemon completes
synchronization. Moreover, our experimental results are averaged over 10 runs.
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(d) Latency for policy deletion
Figure 21: Joplin Microbenchmarks.
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5.5.2.1 Microbenchmarks In this test, we isolate the performance overhead incurred
by Joplin by evaluating various aspects of the access control system. For our workloads, we
developed a policy generator that uses a dictionary of 10000 user and object attribute names
to create synthetic policies with 7–10 predicates in length.
Enclave memory usage. We measure the amount of memory required for loading a
given set of policies inside the enclave. Specifically, we record the memory usage of the Lua
runtime (stores knowledge base and logic engine), as well as the overall enclave runtime.
Results in Figure 21a show that although memory use increases proportionally with the
number of policies, the enclave can support up to 25,000 policies with less than 60MB of
memory. Given that SGX provides about 96MB, this leaves enough space to cache other
objects such as file and directory metadata.
Access evaluation. We measure the latency for the logic engine to generate access
decisions. First, we load the knowledge base with a number of policies, and then assign
attributes that will satisfy the access request. We then query the knowledge base and
record the response latency in Figure 21b. Results show that even with 25,000 policies, the
evaluation latency is about 73.31ms, which is well below the 100ms threshold for noticeable
user delay [139].
Knowledge base refresh. We measure the time for refreshing the knowledge base with
a new set of policies. Results in Figure 21c show that for a small number of policies, the
evaluation latency is as small as 0.2ms, and go up to 200ms for 25,000 policies. However, this
number represents a worse case scenario whereby all the policies are loaded into the enclave,
which could be optimized by selecting the policies that match the requested permission.
Policy store update. We measure the latency for deleting a policy from a volume
hosted on Dropbox. Recall that every in operation in Joplin requires updating and re-
encrypting metadata within the enclave, before committing to the backing store. The results
in Figure 21d show that a policy store of 25,000 rules can be updated in 5s. The overall
latency is mostly dominated by the network cost to synchronize the 3.7MB policy store file.
5.5.2.2 End-to-end Latency In this test, we measure the latency of copying the follow-





















Figure 22: Latency on top of Dropbox
(643MB), and several PDFs documents (315MB). We used 3 prototypes: plain Dropbox,
unmodified NeXUS, and Joplin. For our Joplin prototype, we added an audit policy that
records all directory operations (e.g., when a file is created). Figure 22 shows that compared
to Dropbox, both NeXUS and Joplin have less than a ×2 overhead across workloads. Often-
times, the computational and network processing (i.e., batching, compressing etc.) by the
Dropbox daemon introduced spurious latencies. We recall that the reported value is the total
time required to synchronize data to Dropbox, not the latency experienced by the user. In
both NeXUS and Joplin, the time for copying files to the local folder was well under 5s.
5.5.3 Takeaway Discussion
Our experimental results show that Joplin effectively provides a scalable ABAC system, with
applicability ranging from single user environments to large scale organizations. The mi-
crobenchmarks show support for large working sets, while providing efficient query evaluation
and low administrative overheads. On standard user workloads, Joplin incurs less than a ×2
overhead when synchronizing files inside a shared Dropbox folder.
Joplin is designed to operate within a multi-user environment. Although much of our
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microbenchmarks focused on policies, we extrapolate other costs as follows: granting/revoking
attributes requires a single write operation, and adding/removing users involves updating
2 metadata objects. Unlike pure cryptographic solutions such as ABE that require bulk
data re-encryption and cascading key updates, Joplin only requires updating small metadata
objects to efficiently provide both user and attribute revocation. Additionally, given that
attribute assignments are relatively small (compared to policies), loading them into the
enclave should be fast and use less memory. Therefore, updating the runtime access control
state can be likewise performed efficiently, as it only requires dropping stale attributes from
the knowledge base.
5.6 CONCLUSIONS
We proposed Joplin, a secure ABAC system that leverages trusted hardware to enabled
fine-grained access and usage control on existing storage, without requiring any server-side
coordination. Joplin addresses the technical challenges of decentralized access control by
providing efficient revocation, dynamic policy changes, and multi-domain policy enforcement.
This is enabled by a client-side enclave that provides a tamper-proof, unavoidable, and
verifiable reference monitor. It applies cryptographic protections to user-provided access
control policies and stores it within metadata, which is in turn decrypted for continuous
enforcement at runtime. We describe how different obligations can be supported by our
design. We implemented a prototype by extending NeXUS, a stackable filesystem to enable
fine-grained sharing of protected volumes. Our prototype hosts a Lua-based logic engine
to evaluate access requests, while enabling efficient revocation with forward and backward
secrecy, multi-domain policy enforcement, user delegation, and mandatory access logging.
Using example scenarios and microbenchmarks, our evaluation shows that our prototype can
express a wide range of policies and impose minimal runtime overheads.
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6.0 SECURITY ANALYSIS
By combining encryption and access control within the enclave, NeXUS and Joplin achieve
self-protection [140]: the ability to protect sensitive data from all entities (trusted or untrusted)
using the data’s attached policy. Against the backdrop of threats in Chapter 3, we now
discuss how NeXUS and Joplin meets their security objectives. We consider an attacker who
has complete control over the server, including full access to exchanges with the client, and
a history of the user’s encrypted files. Since we are principally concerned with protecting
user-created content (i.e., file data, file and directory names, access control information), we
foresee the following attacks:
(1) Accessing file data
(2) Modifying file data
(3) Listing directory contents
(4) Moving file/directory to a different location
(5) Reverting file/directory to a previous version
The first four violations affect the confidentiality and integrity of individual files and
directories, while the rest targets the integrity of the filesystem structure and the access
control state. We now demonstrate how our design prevents an attacker from recovering or
tampering protected content. For attack (5), we also assume that the attacker was removed
from a given volume, i.e., the attacker has a copy of the sealed volume rootkey, but does not
have their identity stored inside the supernode.
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6.1 CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY
NeXUS is mainly concerned with the protection of file content, as well as file and directory
names. The user’s files are encrypted in fixed-sized chunks, which are re-encrypted using
fresh keys on every update. These per-chunk encryption keys are stored in the encrypted
portion of the filenode metadata associated with the file. To protect directory entries, we
store the correspondence between the file/directory name and its UUID in the encrypted
portion of the dirnode associated with the directory. Likewise, Joplin stores sensitive volume
information within encrypted metadata, and only performs decryption after proper access
control checks inside the enclave. The attribute space lists all user and object attributes,
the policy store contains all policies, and the assignment table stores both user-assigned
and object-assigned attributes. All metadata are in turn re-encrypted on every update, and
their metadata encryption key is key-wrapped with the volume rootkey. Moreover, because
all enclave cryptography is performed using AEAD symmetric encryption, data integrity
is provided alongside confidentiality. Hence, any illegal modifications of the metadata’s
ciphertext will be detected by the NeXUS enclave. Therefore, to read or modify file contents
and file/directory names, one needs to obtain the volume rootkey.
6.2 AUTHORIZATION: ACCESS TO KEYS
Our security guarantees hinge on the secrecy of the rootkey, which must only be accessible
within the enclave and require validation of the user’s identity before use. The enclave
generates the rootkey at volume creation, before sealing it to local disk to ensure that it
cannot be accessed outside of a valid NeXUS enclave running on this particular processor.
Before permitting the use of a volume rootkey, the NeXUS enclave validates the user’s
identity (Section 4.3.4). To accomplish this, the user must demonstrate proof of knowledge
of the private key associated with a public key stored in the volume’s supernode via a
challenge/response protocol initiated within the enclave. Therefore, even with a sealed copy
of the rootkey, unless the attacker’s public key is stored within the volume’s supernode, they
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will be denied by the enclave.
As shown in Section 4.3.4, we enable secure file sharing by leveraging SGX Remote
Attestation to exchange rootkeys between valid NeXUS enclaves running on genuine SGX
processors. Our construction involves an asynchronous ECDH key exchange in which the
recipient’s NeXUS enclave is remotely attested before securely transmitting the rootkey
encrypted with the ECDH secret. The ECDH keypairs are generated within the enclave, and
their public keys are used to create SGX quotes. Since the ECDH private keys never leave
enclave memory, the ECDH secret can only be derived within the enclave, thereby ensuring
that the rootkey is not leaked unto untrusted storage. However, because we keep long-term
ECDH keypairs fixed and exposed on the remote server, our key exchange protocol fails to
provide perfect forward secrecy. In the event an attacker reconstructs the matching enclave
ECDH private key, they could derive every rootkey exchanged with the user. To mitigate
this, we propose an alternative synchronous solution where both parties generate ephemeral
ECDH keys on every exchange and mutually attest their enclaves. This approach introduces
an additional delay as it involves multiple rounds to attest the enclaves. Please note that in
practice, the security and convenience trade-offs of either approach will be left to the volume
owner.
6.3 ATTACKING THE FILESYSTEM STRUCTURE
Because NeXUS spreads the filesystem state across all metadata files, an attacker may
attempt to modify the filesystem structure in two ways: file-swap attacks and rollback
attacks.
• File-swap attacks: This consist in renaming or moving metadata files to other volume
locations, such that the incorrect metadata file is returned to the enclave. We prevent this
potential mismatch by the use of UUID pointers within our metadata structures, and the
authenticated encryption used to protect these structures: the content of metadata cannot
be altered without detection, and swapping of equivalently named objects will cause the
UUID pointer validation (Section 4.3.3) to fail.
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• Rollback attacks: The server returns older versions of the metadata files to the user.
NeXUS prevents rollback attacks by maintaining a hash-tree within encrypted metadata
(Section 4.3.6). This ensures that: (i) every metadata is fresh with respect to the remote
root hash value, and (ii) the remote root hash is not older than the local root hash value.
In the event (i) is not satisfied (e.g., on first time access), the server still must return a
valid filesystem state. Thus, in effect, our rollback protection raises the attacker’s burden
by requiring the storage of entire volume snapshots, rather than just individual files.
Although our rollback protections provide fork-consistency by ensuring that users always
observe valid volume states, the server could still equivocate about the order of operations and
present different filesystem views to each user. Consider Carey and Alice are collaborating
on a common file; upon request by Alice, the server may equivocate by hiding the changes
performed by Carey and returning an older file to Alice. However, fork consistency limits
equivocation to a single occurrence (diverging user views) and does not require users to
communicate with one another directly [116]. For future work, we plan to explore mitigations
against equivocation attacks with the aid of distributed monotonic counters that provide
global state consistency [62].
6.4 FORWARD AND BACKWARD SECRECY
Joplin prevents arbitrary rollback attacks by ensuring forward and backward secrecy against
revoked and new users, respectively. Revoking an attribute consists in removing the entry
inside the assignment table, updating the last known versions of the volume attribute space
and policy store, and re-encrypting the metadata with a new key. This ensures that: (i)
the revoked user is no longer assigned the attribute, and (ii) older policies cannot be used
with newer assignment tables. Joplin also ensures consistency between filesystem data and
access control information by inlining the object assignment table within filenode and dirnode
metadata. We provide backward secrecy by preventing new assignment tables from being used
with older policies. Please note that Joplin can leverage the rollback protection implemented
in NeXUS (Section 4.3.6).
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7.0 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
Today, the proliferation of consumer devices has led to an explosion in user-generated data,
including pictures, documents, and videos. Cloud-based filesharing platforms provide a
convenient and low-cost solution to meet the burgeoning storage needs of individuals and
organizations alike. Users can access their files on any device and collaborate with one another
on a global scale, while only paying for what they use. However, frequent data breaches
and unplanned disclosures on this platforms have raised serious user privacy concerns. This
dissertation is concerned with developing a practical security solution that ensures data
confidentiality and integrity, without placing any implicit trust in the service provider.
Access control has been extensively studied within traditional closed-world scenarios,
where users and resources are known and rarely change. A simple approach involves a
reference monitor that validates every authorization request against a centralized database.
However, the unique characteristics of the cloud environment pose several challenges that
warrant a reconsideration of trust assumptions and usage scenarios. This includes: (i) data
storage and processing on machines that lie outside the user’s control, (ii) large number of
users accessing a limitless amount of resources provisioned across organizational domains,
and (iii) dynamic changes in access rights as users are added, removed, and modified. As
such, a robust security solution for the cloud must provide scalable policy administration
costs, fine-grained access control to associate users and resources with arbitrary granularity,
while taking into account the local user context when evaluating authorization requests.
To address the above challenges, this dissertation adopts a two-pronged approach by
combining the benefits of cryptography and trusted hardware to protect data both at rest and
during use. Cryptographic protection ensures that sensitive information cannot be feasibly
recovered by the service provider, or leaked as a result of a data breach. On the other
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hand, hardware-enabled Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide a tamper-proof,
non-bypassable, and verifiable reference monitor. As a result, access control enforcement
cannot be subverted by any external party or even authenticated users. We give a summary
of our contributions, as we develop a client-side solution that requires no server-side changes,
and solely relies on trusted hardware readily available on commodity user machines. We close
the chapter with a survey of possible future work.
7.1 SUMMARY
This dissertation’s overall hypothesis is that: the widespread availability of trusted hardware
extensions on consumer devices can provide data confidentiality and integrity, as well as
scalable access and usage control within an untrusted cloud environment, while improving
portability, flexibility, and performance over unmodified storage platforms. Usage control
extends traditional notions of access control in preventing data misuse even beyond user
authorization. Specifically, our aim is to develop a practical solution that is portable across
file sharing platforms without requiring any server-side coordination or trusted intermediary,
flexible in allowing users to share files using fine-grained access control policies, and performant
in imposing modest overheads on typical user workloads and dynamic policy changes. To
this end, we developed NeXUS (Chapter 4) and Joplin (Chapter 5), two client-side solutions
that leverage the Intel SGX trusted hardware to enable scalable data sharing of protected
volumes. We target a deployment model that minimizes the cloud storage interface by storing
metadata as files. This leads to the first research question:
RQ1: How can we adapt cryptographic protection unto cloud-based filesharing platforms?
Existing cryptographic solutions to this problem typically require server-side support,
involve non-trivial key management on the part of users, and suffer from severe re-encryption
penalties upon access revocations. This combination of performance overheads and man-
agement burdens makes this class of solutions undesirable in situations where performant,
platform-agnostic, and dynamic sharing of user content is required. We introduced NeXUS
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(Chapter 4), a privacy-preserving filesystem that provides confidentiality and integrity to user
files on untrusted platforms. Specifically, NeXUS protects file content, as well as file and
directory names. When developing NeXUS, we made the following contributions:
(A1) We propose a client-side architecture to protect sensitive information within a client-
server setting (Section 4.2.1). NeXUS instantiates a distributed access control platform
using trusted hardware, such that the SGX enclave serves as a trusted reference monitor
that executing independently on each client machine rather than centrally on the
(untrusted) server. Compared to alternative architectures, this client-side approach
ensures portable data protection without requiring server-side support for trusted
hardware, nor relying on an enclave controlled by the service provider.
(A2) We present the design of NeXUS to share files hosted on untrusted cloud infrastructure,
while ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of file content as well as file/directory
names (Section 4.3.1). NeXUS performs cryptographic protection and access con-
trol inside a client-side enclave, while ensuring sensitive key material does not leak
to untrusted memory. As a practical system, NeXUS enables seamless and secure
key distribution using metadata files (Section 4.3.3), minimal user key management
(Section 4.3.4), and efficient user revocation (Section 4.3.5).
(A3) We propose a cryptographic protocol that uses SGX remote attestation to enable secure
file sharing across client machines (Section 4.3.4.1). The protocol employs files to
exchange messages on the underlying shared filesystem, and does not require the parties
to be simultaneously online.
(A4) We propose a rollback protection mechanism that prevents the server from returning
stale metadata (Section 4.3.6). Our construction provides stronger freshness guarantees
by leveraging the NeXUS virtual filesystem hierarchy to maintain a hash tree within
encrypted metadata objects. This ensures the volume’s filesystem state results from a
valid sequence of changes without requiring any user-to-user communication.
(A5) We implement NeXUS as a userspace filesystem that allows unmodified applications to
access protected volumes from a mounted directory (Section 4.4). As a practical system,
our minimal enclave takes into account trusted hardware limitations (e.g., limited SGX
memory), as well as the network latency of filesystem operations. We also ported to run
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atop AFS and FUSE; both prototypes are completely client-side and do not require any
server-side modifications. Furthermore, our FUSE prototype improves portability by: (i)
requiring no changes to the OS or underlying filesystem, and (ii) enabling the migration
of volumes by simply copying its directory contents across filesystems. This allows
NeXUS to be readily deployable across storage platforms using any client machine
equipped with SGX hardware.
(A6) We evaluate our FUSE-based NeXUS prototype over two popular remote storage
platforms: Dropbox and AFS (Section 4.5). Specifically, we measured the latency using
microbenchmarks that isolate the overhead of file and directory operations, database
benchmarks, and popular Linux applications. We also measure the performance of
user revocation relative to cryptographic solutions, as well as the overheads of rollback
protection. Results show that NeXUS incurs modest penalties on standard user
workloads, supports a diverse set of applications workflows and storage platforms, and
offers efficient access revocation.
Our work with NeXUS shows that trusted hardware can address the practical challenges of
cryptographic protection over remote untrusted platforms. However, ACLs are coarse-grained
and do not incorporate the environmental context (Section 2.4.1). Attribute-Based Access
Control (ABAC) uses attributes as a level of indirection to separate privilege assignment from
policy specification within an open environment. Thus, we shift our focus to more expressive
access control and usage control enforcement; the former is concerned with fine-grained user
authorization, whereas the latter uses Obligations to prevent future data misuse. Obligations
are mandatory actions that must be fulfilled as part of an authorization request (e.g., record
authorized accesses to a log). This leads to the following research question:
RQ2: How can we provide scalable distributed usage control in a cloud environment?
We present Joplin (Chapter 5), a secure access control and usage control system that
ensures continuous policy enforcement within a protected volume. Joplin addresses the
practical challenges of ABAC, including efficient revocation with forward and backward
secrecy, cross-domain policies, mandatory audit logging, and user delegation. The enclave
unifies policy enforcement by mapping users and resources to access control information stored
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within encrypted metadata objects. At access time, the enclave hosts a policy interpreter
that continuously evaluates system attributes and policies before authorizing access and
performing obligations. To that end, we made the following contributions:
(B1) We propose a client-side architecture that ensures access control information (i.e.,
attributes, policies etc.) is secure and reliable source, while continuously enforcing
user-specified policies and obligations on each authorization request (Section 5.3). We
describe our ABAC model (Section 5.3.3) and policy language (Section 5.3.4), before
performing a taxonomy of obligations that could be readily supported by our client-side
approach (Section 5.3.5). With this, our client-side reference monitor (Section 5.3.6)
can enforce declarative policies in a tamper-proof environment without requiring any
server-side support or trusted intermediary.
(B2) We address the practical challenges of ABAC by instantiating a Joplin prototype that
provides decentralized policy enforcement within a secure filesystem (Section 5.4). The
Joplin enclave uses encrypted metadata to manage volume attributes and policies, such
that access changes require a fixed number of updates. Next, we describe how Joplin
initializes (Section 5.4.2) and enforces policies (Section 5.4.3) with cross-volume support
and user delegation. Our minimal enclave implementation uses a Lua-based Datalog
interpreter to evaluate policies, and employs several caches to speed up authorization
requests (Section 5.4.4). The prototype provides efficient revocation, mandatory access
logging, and can be readily deployed on any SGX client machine.
(B3) We evaluate Joplin using several case studies and filesystem workloads (Section 5.5).
The former explores how a user could share a collection of files using our declarative
policy language, whereas the latter measures the latency and memory use under different
scenarios, as well as the end-to-end impact on top of Dropbox. Results show that our
implementation can efficiently enforce declarative policies, and has policy maintenance
overheads that scale with the number of users and policies. For up to 25,000 policies,
the Joplin enclave can evaluate and refresh its internal access control state in the order
of milliseconds. These results imply that administrators and data owners can protect
files without significant performance degradation on typical workloads.
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As years go by, there has been an exponential growth in the financial and societal costs of
cloud security incidents on service providers and users alike; unfortunately, legal regulations
have had limited impact in curtailing these cloud data breaches. By offering a cheap and
convenient access to large amounts of highly-available storage, the trend of increased user
adoption of cloud-based file sharing services is bound to persist, event at the risk to data
ownership and user privacy. In this dissertation, we want to provide a practical security
tool that is easy to install and use, such that users can employ across storage platforms.
Furthermore, users do not need to place any trust on the service provider, other than providing
data storage and availability. Both NeXUS and Joplin demonstrates that individuals and
organizations can manage their files on existing storage platforms using rich access control
primitives, without requiring any external party or changes on the server. Their enclaves are
self-contained, have a small Trusted Computing Base (TCB), and can be setup to manage
multiple volumes for cross-domain collaboration. Through our implementation and evaluation,
we improve the user privacy on these cloud-based services using only mass market trusted
hardware already present on modern user machines. Overall, our client-side design and
implementation provides a solid foundation for developing user-centric and decentralized
policy enforcement using modern trusted hardware.
7.2 FUTURE WORK
The growing adoption of trusted hardware technology by major vendors can fundamentally
transform how we design secure systems. Given that seamless privacy-preserving computation
is the foundation of our approach, we see the following avenues for future work:
Applicability to other distributed systems. Although our current work pertains to se-
cure file sharing, our client-side architecture could be adapted to protect other distributed
applications. Our deployment model targets situations whereby sensitive data is com-
pletely generated on the client and the server mainly provides storage. Specifically, the
server returns data to the client after performing very little data processing, such that
sensitive user data can be modified without disrupting the server’s operation. Example
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client-server applications include key-value stores, messaging, and even web services.
However, each scenario has a unique request-response pattern when accessing remote data,
as well as imposes particular memory and processing requirements. As a result, these
factors have to be taken into account when designing a practical and scalable system.
For example, the hierarchical organization of filesystems require traversing the parent
directories before fetching the target file; this may not the case for key-value stores that
has a flat namespace.
Alternative Client-server Architecture. Adopting a client-side approach facilitates user
deployment across storage platforms, but this has several drawbacks including, coarse
data access, high network latency, and lack of support for concurrent access. As shown by
the NeXUS benchmarks, this results in significant performance overheads on metadata-
intensive workloads (e.g., writing inside a large directory). Although users of typical
file sharing services are largely unaffected in their daily use, these overheads limit the
applicability of our approach where performant and highly-granular data access is required.
Alternatively, as trusted hardware support on the cloud continues to grow, we consider a
different architecture that splits the computation between client–server enclaves. The
client will still be responsible for access control and managing the encryption keys, but can
temporarily share key material with a server-side counterpart to decrypt large datasets on
demand. The server-side enclave never persists any secret key material, but can decrypt
sensitive content to fulfill metadata intensive operations. For example, when listing a
directory, the server-side enclave could collect all the file information in advance and send
it to the client via a secure channel. Due to data proximity, this approach is significantly
faster than downloading the individual files on the client. Furthermore, the server-side
enclave could provide stronger security guarantees, such as oblivious data access with an
ORAM controller and rollback protection using a global monotonic counter.
Richer Authorization and Obligation support. Another direction for future work is to
extend our ABAC authorization model to support more complex relationships between
attributes, such as hierarachies and constraints. A richer policy language will be required
to capture these relations. As for usage control, our taxonomy in Chapter 5 lists all the
applicable obligations within our client-side architecture. In addition to mandatory access
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logging, we could implement other usage scenarios such as automatically deleting sensitive
information from the cloud using data retention policies. Also, given the availability
server-side enclave, an alternative architecture could provide access to global user context
information (e.g., the number of users online).
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